



# ANALYTICAL REPORT

## Towards Efficient Reintegration Policies: Advances and Challenges

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# Mapping the Context: Models, Scenarios, Discussions, Experience of Policies of Reintegration

## Domestic political and international contexts

We regard reintegration models as different alternative sets of conditional choices of particular tools and measures aimed at conflict resolution and reconciliation based on short-term and long-term goals regarding specific target groups and beneficiaries, victims and / or those affected by the war and occupation (e. g., internally displaced persons and residents of temporarily occupied territories or frontline areas), and Ukrainian society and the state in general. At the same time, the choice of such individual tools and measures should take into account both international and internal previous experience of their implementation as well as a comprehensive analysis and modeling of various potential options for conflict resolution and reintegration.

One should not forget that when talking about the policy of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories, we must understand that the subject of such a policy is twofold: on the one hand, the policy of reintegration should be a policy of a "fight for the people" and on the other hand – of a "fight for the territory". Besides, policies in the context of both these types of struggles must not contradict but complement and reinforce each other. It is also important to use soft power both in contexts of the "fight for the people" and the "fight for the territory" (*Українська призма, 2020, p. 7*).

First of all, we analyzed empirical research on the perceptions and attitudes of Ukrainians towards specific policies and measures aimed at reintegration (*Бурковський, Осипчук, Суслов & Яковлев, 2020; Резнік, 2021; Осипчук, Суслов & Усачова, 2021; ДІФ, 2017*), especially those proposed in the draft law On State Policy of Transition Period (*Осипчук & Суслов, 2021*); attitudes toward specific categories of Ukrainians affected by Russian aggression and measures to support them, for example, internally displaced persons or youth from the temporarily occupied territories (*ШПА, 2020a, 2020b; Рябчук, 2020; МОМ, 2020; Symeou, Dryga & Lordos, 2021; Lordos et al., 2021*); comprehensive research on frontline communities and territories in the context of reintegration policy (*Гірник & Золкіна, 2017*), in particular, those that addressed the issue of social distances and social trust in communities (*SCORE, 2019a, 2019b; Zarembo, 2020*).

The analysis of all these and other research only emphasizes that it is necessary to reveal not only the prevalence of certain moods or to measure attitudes but also to interview in detail the target audiences, beneficiaries, and the general public, experts and policy makers about their understanding of particular policies or their interpretation of specific concepts and steps.

In the international context, Russia's hybrid military aggression against Ukraine with the creation of pseudo-state entities in some parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions as well as the attempt to annex the Crimean Peninsula raised the issue of compliance with international agreements, particularly in terms of compliance with security obligations (*Miras, 2018; Butkevych, 2018*), especially the Budapest Memorandum (*Yost, 2015; Budjeryn, 2015; Pifer, 2019a*).

Taking into account all problems, which intensified in the context of international relations by the hybrid military aggression of Russia against Ukraine, one should focus on the following problem areas of scenarios and plans for Ukraine:

- 1) the role of international organizations designed to prevent wars and maintain security, their ability to perform their functions effectively, in particular concerning those states that violate international agreements (including the capabilities of the UN Security Council in which Russia has a veto) (*Russian- Ukrainian Conflict: Prospects and Parameters of UN Peacekeeping Mission in Donbas, 2018*);
- 2) mechanisms for compliance with the obligations taken by different states, including the provision of security guarantees to other states (in the case of Ukraine – the Budapest Memorandum, bilateral agreements with Russia);
- 3) the prospect of an international peacekeeping mission in Ukraine (its composition, format, mandate, responsibility, etc.), which is complicated by the difficulty of involving international organizations, especially those in which Russia plays an important role, and by the difficulty of holding states liable for failing to meet their security obligations;
- 4) the fragility of the sanctions mechanism against Russia (as well as its companies and citizens) which have a complex structure and appear to be dependent on the political situation in the countries and organizations that impose these sanctions;
- 5) the problem of formulating a consolidated position within individual states, the EU, and international organizations on Russia in the context of economic and political interests of those states and organizations regarding cooperation with Russia, especially the supply of Russian energy to European countries and the pro-Russian lobby in European countries – such as populist parties supported by the Kremlin (*Polyakova, 2014; Weiss, 2020*).

To sum up, it should be noted that the limitations that Ukraine faces in the international dimension of the policy of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories are self-evident. At the same time, it is difficult to disagree with the conclusion by the analysts from the think tank Ukrainian Prism that "the only effective interpretation of the popular phrase "do not provoke Russia" should be not a policy of appeasing the aggressor but a policy of creating conditions under which the Kremlin will consider the escalation inexpedient because the expected losses will exceed the possible gains" (*Українська призма, 2020, p. 2*). It is also crucial to maintain Ukraine's initiative and participation in all consultations and negotiations on the situation in Ukraine and to articulate a consistent and strategic position on the defense and attainment of its state interests.

## Reintegration: reparations for economic losses

The issue of economic compensation for losses caused by the Russian occupation forces is relevant on the international agenda since it directly implies international pressure on Russia from other countries. In this context, Ukraine's insistence on prosecuting specific individuals as criminals and Russia as an aggressor country is also important. Such prosecution also involves assessing the damage that Ukraine suffered as the result of the attempted annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas. It includes various types of losses, particularly fiscal ones due to the shortfall in tax and other revenues to the state budget of Ukraine.

According to the National Institute for Strategic Studies, the actual losses of tax revenues of the consolidated budget due to the hybrid war of the Russian Federation in 2014-2018 amounted to UAH -666.8 billion (Касперович, 2018). In February 2021, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, Oleksiy Reznikov, stated that the losses from the occupation of territories in Donetsk and Luhansk regions amounted to UAH 375 billion, "excluding assets", and the cost of restoration was estimated at more than USD 21 billion (Економічна правда, 2021).

The "National Report" lists approaches to assessing the damages caused by Russian aggression that include (but are not limited to) losses of industrial, settlement and social infrastructure, direct human losses (as well as significant deterioration of human development opportunities), environmental losses (Лібанова (ed), 2015). Thus, the economic and legal mechanisms for the reconstruction of Donbas should include not only ways to attract investments but also:

- 1) the possibility of prosecuting those who were directly involved in the causing of economic damages in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADLR) – for example, those who were directly involved in the relocation of equipment to Russia and / or "sawing" plants and factories for scrap metal, or just stealing of the property;
- 2) bringing to justice Russia as an aggressor country that has caused damage to Ukraine, so that it will be possible to begin the restoration of production, settlement, and other infrastructure with Russia's funds;
- 3) restoring ownership of property expropriated from Ukrainian citizens in the temporarily occupied territories, both in Crimea and CADLR, especially considering the recent statements by the leaders of the occupation administration about the "expropriation" of houses and apartments in these territories where no one lives at the moments.

## Transitional Justice and Institutional Reforms

Today's situation with the reintegration of Certain Areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions (CADLR) and Crimea requires decisive and clear actions from our country. A crucial positive step of our state toward the reintegration of Crimea is the adoption of the Strategy for De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (*Presidential Decree №117/2021*) (**hereinafter – the Strategy**) in March 2021 and an action plan for the implementation of this Strategy in September 2021. Transitional justice is an essential element of peacebuilding mentioned in the Strategy for De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Crimea.

In 2020, the working group on the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of the Commission on Legal Reform under the President of Ukraine developed a draft Concept of Transitional Justice, which is still awaiting approval (*Рада національної безпеки і оборони України, 2020*). However, some experts whom we interviewed informed us that adoption of this document is not on the current agenda.

At the same time, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories (hereinafter – the Ministry of Reintegration) developed the draft law "On the Principles of

State Policy of the Transition Period" (*Мінреінтеграції, 2020a*). This document has two primary goals: (1) to introduce key principles of transitional justice into Ukrainian legislation, and (2) to start the nationwide dialogue on the crucial issues of post-conflict settlement. The draft law was approved by the Cabinet of Ministers in August 2021 and now is under consideration in the Verkhovna Rada. Although hundreds of comments on the draft were collected by the Ministry of Reintegration, there is a need for further broader dialogue both with experts and society.

Nevertheless, a positive step is the identification of key responsible institutions to design the principles of transitional justice in Ukraine: the Ministry of Reintegration (*Cabinet of Ministers Resolution № 376 as amended on 06.05.2020*) and the President's representative office in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (*Presidential Decree № 758/2019*). Equally important is the introduction of the concept of "transitional justice" in the Ukrainian legal field and its inclusion in such strategic documents as Strategy for De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol and National Strategy for Human Rights. However, **the legal framework still needs to be improved, in particular the definition of "transitional justice", the absence of which currently causes difficulties in the activities of state institutions**, and it should not be interpreted strictly through a narrow criminal justice lens (*Комітет Верховної Ради України з питань прав людини, національних меншин і міжнаціональних відносин, 2021*).

It is also significant that some principles of transitional justice are already being implemented. Several institutions investigate **crimes related to the armed conflict** within their jurisdiction: the Office of the Prosecutor General (the Department for Supervision of Criminal Proceedings on Crimes Committed in the Conditions of Armed Conflict was established in February 2020), the regional prosecutor's offices of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the Security Service of Ukraine and several units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, further legislative work should be done to make their efforts more efficient, including **ratification of the Rome Statute** and adjustment of the provisions on the terms of pre-trial investigation and high treason to the context of the armed conflict (*Комітет Верховної Ради України..., 2021*).

In order to form a legal framework that would regulate the liability of individuals for committing various actions in the temporarily occupied territories, four bills on so-called collaborationism were introduced in the Verkhovna Rada (№ 2549, 5135, 5143, 5144). The bills received a negative assessment from relevant civil society, human rights, and dialogue organizations (*ZMINA, 2021a*). On the one hand, this situation demonstrates public and political demand for settlement of transitional justice issues. On the other hand, it shows that some political elites do not understand the critical goal of transitional justice, which is strengthening public confidence on both sides and achieving long-term peace. To attain these goals, the MPs, relevant ministry, and civil society organizations should cooperate in order to adopt legislation that will fix Ukraine's position on who is hostage to the situation in the TOT and who will be liable for their actions. In addition, it is vital to draft a law that would determine the status of war criminals (*Переосмислення..., 2020*).

**The right to the truth** until the end of the conflict is exercised by collecting and accumulating facts about the events that took place during the conflict in the affected area, including human rights violations, witnesses' testimonies, and the documentation of all this information. Whilst the information is already being collected by NGOs, a special department in the Prosecutor General's Office, and the respective regional Prosecutor's Offices, **the scheduled**

**launch, before the end of 2021, of a national documentation center “The Ukrainian National Center for Peacebuilding” is a necessary step that should be implemented as soon as possible. Another important task will be to establish cooperation between the Center and non-governmental organizations documenting human rights violations since the beginning of Russia's armed aggression and to organize the transfer of their accumulated data to the state archives.**

**Compensation for damages.** Only in September 2020, the Cabinet of Ministers approved the "Procedure for using funds provided in the state budget for monetary compensation to victims whose houses (apartments) were destroyed as a result of a military emergency caused by armed aggression of the Russian Federation" (КМУ, 2020). For the implementation of this budget program in 2021, UAH 114 million is pledged to help 380 victims (Мінреінтеграції, 2021e). At the same time, according to the Ministry of Reintegration, in the Luhansk region about 375 families need compensation for destroyed housing and in the Donetsk region – 318 (2020b).

On March 1, 2021, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine registered bill № 5177 "On Protection of Property Rights and Other Real Rights of Victims of Armed Aggression", which deals with a broader range of property issues in more detail (see [detailed analysis here](#): Право на захист, 2021a, 2021a). The coalition of relevant NGOs advises **"to adopt this bill in the first reading with further revision"** (ZMINA, 2021b).

Necessary steps towards de-occupation and further reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories, in particular in the context of transitional justice, include effective institutional reforms and strengthening the rule of law in Ukraine (Переосмислення..., 2020). Institutional reforms in the context of transitional justice primarily concern the security sector and the judiciary. The main goal of these reforms is to provide an institutional environment in which both law enforcement and the judiciary would be trustworthy for all parties after the end of the conflict.

Ukraine also **must already work hard to complete decentralization reform. It will allow to spread positive experience to the returned territories and to create positive expectations of TOT residents regarding the future of their territorial communities after de-occupation** (Переосмислення..., 2020, с. 24).

Necessary institutional reforms also include strengthening the country's defense capabilities as a significant factor on the path to de-occupation of its territories.

One way to strengthen transitional justice activities is to coordinate them with **the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Program** (United Nations, 2010, p. 11) which indicates the need for appropriate discussion and designing of such a program.

The broad involvement of civil society is also a necessary step in developing policies and laws related to the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories. During the years of occupation, NGOs systematically have been raising different issues pertaining to reintegration policy and the need to protect the rights and freedoms of Ukrainians in the occupied Crimea and CADLR. Relevant civil society organizations have ideas that would help representatives of ministries to develop high-quality policies for reintegrating the temporarily occupied territories.

## Information and cultural aspects of reintegration policy

Regarding the information and cultural component of reintegration policy, it should first be noted that most experts in interviews and analytical materials talk about the exceptional importance of these spheres (see, e. g.: Гірник & Золкіна, 2017; Кіпень & Бондаренко, 2019; Переосмислення..., 2020; Усачова, 2020; Большешапов, Хмельовський & Чупіс, 2020; Війна на Донбасі, 2019).

At the same time, the implementation of a proactive and effective policy of information and cultural reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories requires both significant resources and coordinated efforts of various agents.

Unfortunately, despite the importance of this sphere, policy making and drafting of all these documents is not sufficiently and systematically coordinated. Partly that is due to the constant institutional changes in the structure of the executive branch of government and the bodies responsible for the development of such strategies which inhibited the work and led to a change in priorities.

The importance of such a part of cultural and information policy as commemorative practices, i. e. specific measures in the field of memory policy, should be emphasized. In the context of the events in Eastern Ukraine, it might be primarily a matter of "already honoring the victims of Russia's armed aggression now", which is supported by two-thirds of Ukrainians (Осипчук & Суслов, 2021, с. 12).

In this report, we will not stop separately on the information and cultural policy of reintegration as it has often been the focus of both our materials and the reports by other experts and NGOs. Thus, among the main challenges are: counteracting of **the information influence of the Russian Federation and its propaganda; reaching out to and attracting the "end consumer", i. e. the audience; improving the communication of all Ukrainian authorities, both internal and external; diversification the content and channels of influence; "vagueness and fuzziness of strategic narrative for TOT residents"** (Кіпень & Бондаренко, 2019, с. 6-7).

Solving these problems requires significant resources, both material and human, as well as systematic work and coordination. Among the steps in this direction are: the concentration of authority regarding an information and cultural policy of reintegration within the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and IDPs (*Постанова Кабінету міністрів України №371-2020п від 6 травня 2020*), the transfer of several budget programs to this Ministry and also the creation of the Center for Combating Disinformation at the National Security and Defense Council by the Decree of the President of Ukraine №106 / 2021 of March 19, 2021, and the creation of the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security under the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy.

## Policy to support internally displaced persons

According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, as of April 6, 2021, the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine is 1,464,171 (MOM, 2021). According to the monitoring reports of the International Organization for Migration (MOM, 2019), the main problems for IDPs remain socio-economic, especially employment (average among IDPs is 47% vs. 59% for Ukraine as a whole), significantly lower average per capita income per month, compared to the average in Ukraine as a whole (UAH 3631 against UAH 5398), problems with housing - it is the lack of own housing that is called the "biggest problem" 37% (MOM, 2019, p. 7-8). Such indicators clearly illustrate why state aid (social benefits) remains a significant part of the budgets of IDP households and therefore its termination and renewal are important issues.

Speaking about the specifics of the policy on internally displaced persons in the context of reintegration, several areas should be distinguished: support and promotion of the reintegration of IDPs into new communities; compensation for losses and securing property rights of IDPs in respect of property in the temporarily occupied territories; ensuring access to justice and protection of family members left on the TOT, in particular in cases of persecution of relatives, their disappearance, etc., as well as ensuring the right to the truth and documenting the facts related to the occupation. The latter two areas are not exclusive to IDPs and rather belong to a set of measures to ensure transitional justice.

Since the beginning of the aggression in 2014, the issues of supporting IDPs and their integration, including socio-economic, into their new communities, their access to educational, medical, and other services, political rights, etc. have been on the frontline and of the utmost importance for Ukraine. This is what the efforts of the state, line ministries, the public sector, and international organizations have been (and still are) focused on. Of course, over the years, IDPs have been provided for a certain level of basic needs and various support programs for IDPs have been implemented.

During 2018-2020, the Ukrainian authorities adopted several legislative changes that made it possible for internally displaced persons to participate (vote) in local and national elections. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that the availability of such an opportunity does not automatically lead to the participation of IDPs in elections. **This indicates the need for targeted policies and programs for IDPs, including information policies, civic education and participation. It is also an indirect evidence of their lack of integration into new communities.**

Housing security is a cornerstone issue for internally displaced persons. Although several state programs for the compensation or material assistance for damaged housing have already been launched, IDPs cannot benefit from them as reimbursement is possible only if people have not left the settlement where they lived. At the same time, compensation for destroyed housing is available for them (*Право на захист, 2021b, p.4*).

IDPs' awareness of targeted state housing programs, especially those offering non-temporary solutions, is also insufficient. Not all IDPs, even from the target categories, are aware that there are government programs for free / unpaid accommodation for certain groups of IDPs (MOM, 2020, c. 22).

In general, experts say that although several housing programs for internally displaced persons have been introduced, most of them are targeted only at certain small categories of IDPs and therefore remain inaccessible to most (*Право на захист, 2021b, p. 4*). To sum up: **there is a need for funding and implementation of various state housing programs as well as wider availability of such programs to IDPs of different categories.**

The question of how internally displaced persons see their lives "after" the occupation should also be raised. Though it is not only a question of assessing people's possible plans for the future, or of indirectly assessing the level of their integration into new communities and / or their life satisfaction.

There is **a significant proportion of IDPs who are going to return** (*MOM, 2019, p. 7*), **which is exacerbated by the factors of ready availability of housing and property ownership in the temporarily occupied territories. The Ukrainian authorities should be ready to offer IDPs several options for support in case of a return, as well as to develop effective and realistic policies to reduce social tension and facilitate reconciliation between internally displaced persons returning and residents of the temporarily occupied territories.** Moreover, the development of such policies and programs which should include both socio-economic and political-legal and information-cultural aspects cannot be postponed.

## Politics after de-occupation

Analysts differ on the specific steps that should be taken after the return of the temporarily occupied territories. Most point to the need for temporary administrations, possibly under UN or OSCE supervision or with cooperation with them. In turn, the Razumkov Center's study argues the need to create military-civilian administrations, as well as to establish a military commandant's office (*Війна на Донбасі, 2019*). Thus, given these options, the establishment of temporary administrations should be a necessary step after the return of the temporarily occupied territories.

In January 2021, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine published a first draft of a framework law "On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period", which also contains provisions on the establishment of military-civil administrations. In June 2021, a second draft was released after which the draft was approved by the government, got overall positive even if critical review by the Venice Commission, and is currently under consideration in the Parliament (#5844). Regarding temporary administrations, it is still unknown what format they will take. This should be an issue for discussion and approval for representatives of relevant authorities, as well as the civil sector.

In parallel with the creation of temporary administrations, the quasi-state institutions of the so-called "DPR" and "LPR" (*Війна на Донбасі, 2019*), as well as the occupation authorities of the Russian Federation in the Crimea should be liquidated. Also, the functioning of Ukrainian banks and mass media must be resumed, civil status acts must be audited, and the occupation and Russian media must be shut down. This process should be accompanied by consultations with international partners.

The draft law also regulates issues of amnesty and lustration. Amnesty will not be applied to the persons who committed serious crimes (including war crimes) and foreign cit-

izens who were members of occupation forces and administrations. Restrictions on the right to be elected in local elections and to hold office are to be imposed on persons who were members of the occupation forces and administrations of the Russian Federation and either harmed or did not harm the lives and health of citizens. These restrictions are also to be imposed on the top leadership of the occupation forces and administrations of the Russian Federation. According to the Venice Commission's opinion<sup>1</sup> on the draft law "On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period", terms and procedures for amnesty and lustration should be clarified.

Elections after the return of the temporarily occupied territories remain an important issue. The draft law "On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period" provides an algorithm for holding elections to local self-government bodies after de-occupation. It states that first local elections after de-occupation must be held simultaneously with regular local elections in Ukraine but only if Ukrainian legislation and established procedures are observed as well as OSCE and Council of Europe's standards.

The draft law does not regulate the participation of residents of the temporarily occupied territories in presidential or parliamentary elections, but these provisions should be clearly outlined. The authors of the analytical report "Dialogue for Unity: Is Ukraine Ready?" (Радченко, Кашенець & Біруля, 2021) provide expert assessments of the period after which elections can be held after de-occupation. Most experts believe it to be five years. Similarly, experts emphasize that international experience shows the importance of temporary administrations in ensuring elections (Золкіна, 2020).

As experts' positions differ, the issue of elections in the temporarily occupied territories after their return requires updating and separate regulations. In addition, analysts from several human rights organizations, including Vostok SOS, say that some provisions of the draft law "On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period" are contrary to the principles of legal certainty. Comments from the Venice Commission point to the same and emphasize the need to establish clear definitions and procedures. The repeal of some laws in case of adoption of this draft law will create gaps in regulation (Аналіз проєкту закону, 2021). That is why the draft law needs to be finalized in the Parliament and its committees with the direct involvement of all relevant institutions and actors as well as human rights organizations.

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<sup>1</sup> European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). (2021, 18 October). Opinion No.1046/2021 ON THE DRAFT LAW "ON THE PRINCIPLES OF STATE POLICY OF THE TRANSITION PERIOD". [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD\(2021\)038-e](https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2021)038-e)

# Mapping the Stakeholders of Policies of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories

Reintegration policies have a plethora of stakeholders both on national and on local levels as well as from governmental and from civil society sectors. Each institution has specific resources to participate in the process of creating and implementing these policies. The Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine is the main stakeholder and central executive body which performs the functions of forming and coordinating policies related to the reintegration and de-occupation of the temporarily occupied territories. It is important to note, that this minister is at the same time the Vice Prime Minister, which creates conditions for more systematic and faster communication between the authorities and government officials. However, this ministry cannot cover the full range of measures needed to implement comprehensive and effective policies. In addition, the Ministry of Reintegration has limited resources to cope with the full range of tasks. Therefore, almost all central executive bodies, services and agencies are involved in the process.

In particular, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy through its structural units and other state bodies that are coordinated by it develops and implements measures aimed at reintegration in the cultural and information policy realm. For example, the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory plays an important role in shaping the vision of a common past in the unification and reintegration of the population. The State Agency of Ukraine for Cinematography and the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine are involved in the distribution of content and information / cultural products to the temporarily occupied territories.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs deals with issues of de-occupation and reintegration of the TOT at the international level. For example, it is responsible for communication with representatives of the "Normandy Four" and representatives of other countries to accumulate support and expand cooperation with the international community regarding de-occupation of the temporarily occupied territories and an imposition of sanctions against Russia.

The Ministry of Veterans Affairs ensures the formation and implementation of state policy in the field of social protection and issues relevant for war veterans, persons with special merits to the Motherland, victims of the Revolution of Dignity.

The Ministry of Justice represents Ukraine's interests in the European and other international courts and has competency in the sphere of transitional justice and protecting the rights of displaced persons and residents of the temporarily occupied territories.

An important role is played by the Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (PPU). The PPU is engaged in analytical activities and monitoring of the situation in Crimea, as well as in the development of laws and regulations related to the temporary occupation of Crimea and protection of rights and freedoms of the population (IDPs and those who remained in the occupied territories).

We should also add other ministries to the list of stakeholders: the Ministry of Social Policy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Education and Science, the Ministry of Regional Development, Construction and Housing, the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Digital Transformation, as well as local governments in Kherson, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, military-civil and oblast state administrations, etc.

The main legislative body in Ukraine – the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Ukrainian Parliament) is also involved in the process of formulation of reintegration policies. It has the thematic committee – the Committee on Human Rights, De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk, Luhansk Oblasts and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the City of Sevastopol, National Minorities, and International Relations. Its sphere of competency overlaps a bit with the Committee of Legal Policy and the Humanitarian and Information Policy Committee. The Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights supervises the observance of human and civil rights and freedoms on the territory of Ukraine, especially with its regional representatives and offices in some regions and cities (oblasts and oblast centers).

A separate niche is occupied by the civil society organizations which act as an intermediate link between government agencies and society. The civil society can be divided into groups according to several criteria, for example:

- by regional affiliation: those dealing exclusively with the issues of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and those dealing exclusively with the problems of the Crimean Peninsula.
- by subject / area of interest: human rights, volunteers, educational and / or analytical centers, mediation initiatives, veteran organizations, IDPs organizations etc.

Various civil society organizations, charitable and volunteer foundations implement projects to help those who need it, monitor and analyze the situation within the government-controlled and uncontrolled territories of Ukraine, provide advisory services to the authorities, design and implement information campaigns regarding information security and warfare, Russian military aggression and temporary occupation of Donbas and Crimea.

# Methodology

Methodologically the research combined qualitative and quantitative approaches: representative survey, interviews, focus-groups, and elements of ethnographic fieldwork. This combination of methods is aimed to yield information of different kinds: the spread and scope of attitudes and public opinion (survey) was partially matched by an in-depth analysis of expert opinions and people's understandings of different concepts (focus groups and interviews).

Quantitative part of research allowed us to get the distribution of attitudes and opinions of respondents toward reintegration policies, steps, measures, and scenarios as well as to build a comprehensive model and (potentially) an index for further usage.

Qualitative part of the research allowed us to analyse in-depth what lies behind the evaluation and attitudes demonstrated by respondents in the survey. Thus, we got an insight into how they understand the questions and particular policies and measures. Especially as for some questions in the surveys the percentage of non-answers or 'yes and no' option could be over 30% and quantitative methodology is not an appropriate tool for getting into the motives of respondents who chose these options. During interviews and focus-groups, the narratives, messages, and scenarios of reintegration that are present in media (of different kinds and origin, including propagandistic) as well as their perception by respondents were also discussed.

Finally, the field trips to Kramatorsk, Sieverodonetsk, Mariupol and Kherson and adjacent amalgamated communities (OTH) were conducted to collect ethnographic data, including visual, and conduct additional interviews with locals.

Thus, the project research contained four empirical phases:

**1) The national representative survey / a public opinion poll** was conducted from mid-July to mid-August 2021 on a sample of 2910 respondents by subcontractor (Info Sapiens) based on the questionnaire designed by the School for Policy Analysis. The survey method was Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviews (CATI). Respondents were able to choose the language of the questionnaire / interview (Ukrainian or Russian). The maximum theoretical error had not exceeded 2.2%. The sample is representative by sex, age, type of settlement and size of the settlement / locality. 2000 interviews were the sample for the population of Ukraine aged 18+, with additional boosters for Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (+680 interviews) and Odesa and Kherson oblasts (+230 interviews). The Autonomous Republic of Crimea had been removed from the study, while in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions the survey was conducted only in the territories controlled by Ukraine. The sample of 2000 was representative for six macro-regions, whilst the boosters (910) permitted comparison of target "boosted" regions and macro-regions. Thus, the overall survey sample was 2910.

**The Questionnaire** regarding certain reintegration policies and possible measures and steps has been designed based on our desk research and consultations with stakeholders, human right activists, and experts. The Questionnaire contains the

thematic blocs and socio-demographic set of questions. The latter had been added by subcontractor (Info Sapiens) and included questions regarding age, gender, type and size of locality, level of education, employment status, level of material well-being (subjective), language of communication (by self-determination), and religious identity / affiliation (by self-determination).

Thematic blocs referred to different reintegration policies and scenarios, including geopolitical orientations. Major set of questions were about different aspects of transitional justice (amnesty, lustration, electoral rights, restitutions, documentation); economic re-integration and development of temporary occupied areas and neighbouring territories; informational and cultural politics, including de-communisations and commemoration practices; possible scenarios for conflict resolution and relations with Western partners and Russia; future status of temporary occupied Crimea and areas of Donbas etc. Questions sometimes were not grouped thematically to prevent the respondents from answering automatically and to increase validity.

Almost all questions but three are “statement questions” with a Likert-type scale to measure attitude – level of approval or support on a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is Totally disapprove and 5 is Totally approve. Three remaining questions are multiple choice with one option. All questions contain a “Hard to tell / Refuse to answer” alternative which is not read to the respondent but possible to them to choose on their own.

“Statement” questions with Likert-type scales allow for a much wider spectrum of statistical and mathematical techniques and models to be performed as they represent a range or interval type of data / scale and not a nominal like a multiple-choice variety. With Likert-type scale questions it is possible to do a factor-analysis or build regression models to uncover the causal relations between different factors and indicators, and not just correlations.

The downside of that is that inevitably such questions should be worded definitely and precisely, which often might seem provoking, otherwise the answers won't yield meaningful information for further analysis. To balance this, we included questions with opposite assumptions or orientations, to avoid the influence of so called “biases”. Then the respondent will notice that though each particular question represents one particular statement of certain orientation which may or may not correspond to his, the next one is coming from the ‘opposite side’ and overall will get the questionnaire that is balanced with no possibility to predict the ‘socially-desirable’ answers. Also, more “neutral” questions are put at the start of the questionnaire to warm-up the respondents and to establish the contact.

Additional consultation with representatives of the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories were held regarding the questionnaire, its general scope of the topics and questions and their wording. The Ministry's recommendations were integrated into the final version of the questionnaire.

**2)** Semi-structured in-depth consultations and interviews. Six (6) interviews / consultations with stakeholders' representatives – NGO experts, human rights activists, government officials (the Ministry of Reintegration and members of the Verkhovna Rada's relevant committees), were held during the desk research stage over month 1 (the second half of April – first half of May 2021) to narrow down the research questions. Over month 2-4 (mid-May – mid-August 2021) nineteen (19) more

interviews were conducted to get further in-depth information from stakeholders, including representatives of the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporary Occupied Territories, Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Cultural and Informational Politics, members of Parliamentary Committees, civil organization activists, and experts regarding policies of reintegration, their components and formulation, transitional justice, and particular reintegration measures and scenarios. Five (5) more interviews to get additional information were held over month 5 (mid-August – mid- September 2021).

**3) Focus-groups** (focus group discussions or FGD) were held in target regions online and video-recorded. The selection of participants for focus groups was done on representative principle, with a specific research focus on IDPs and people from target regions. Nineteen (19) focus groups were planned according to configurations that were drawn upon our desk research and available statistical data (number of IDPs per region, their demographics, the accentuation on people who cross contact line / administrative line often as potential key informants), and general social science methodological requirements for the number of FGDs with different TA categories as well as with so called general population 'control groups' that are necessary to validate and triangulate data. The latter focus groups also provided insights into general population thoughts, opinions, and reflections on reintegration policies and measures. Recruitment of participants, technical support, and video recording were done by Info Sapiens. There were 135 participants in total on these 19 focus groups. The configuration of focus groups were following:

- Three (3) FGD with IDPs from Crimea: No. 1 – Crimean Tatars, No. 2 – Crimean IDPs in large cities (Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Kherson), No. 3 – Crimean IDPs in small towns (relevant oblasts).
- Four (4) FGDs with IDPs in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, 2 FGDs per oblast: 1 in each – large cities (No. 4 – Mariupol, Kramatorsk, No. 5 – Severodonetsk), and 1 in each – small towns (No. 6 – Volnovakha / Pokrovsk / Bakhmut /, etc., No. 7 – Rubizhne / Starobilsk /, etc.). Each group had 3 IDPs who have moved from a large city (Donetsk, Luhansk) and 3 from a small one.
- Three (3) FGD on IDPs who reside in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kharkiv oblasts: No. 8 and No. 9 – oblast centers (2 IDPs from each), No. 10 – oblast cities (2 IDPs from each oblast).
- Four (4) FGD with the general population of Odessa and Kherson oblasts, 2 FGDs per oblast: 1 in each oblast – the oblast center (No. 11 – Odessa, No. 12 – Kherson), 1 in each oblast – a small town (No. 13 – cities of 20-100 thousand Odessa region, No. 14 – cities of 20-100 thousand Kherson region).
- Four (4) FGDs with the general population of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, 2 FGDs per oblast: 1 in each oblast – large cities (No. 15 – Mariupol, Kramatorsk, No. 16 – Severodonetsk); 1 in each oblast – small towns (No. 17 – Volnovakha / Pokrovsk / Bakhmut /, etc.) , No. 18 – Rubizhne / Starobilsk /, etc.).
- One (1) FGD (No. 19) with those who crossed the line of contact in the last 12 months – may be a mix of the general population and IDPs.

One more focus group (20th) was held online with students and university graduates who are IDPs (8 participants in total). Recruiting and recording for this group were done by SPA.

4) Across month 4- month 5 (mid-July – August 2021) of the implementation, the field trips to Kramatorsk, Sieverodonetsk, Mariupol and Kherson (and adjacent communities) were conducted to collect anecdotal evidence and primary data (visual and ethnographic), conduct additional interviews with locals (including local authorities and civic sector activists). These trips and collected data served as triangulation and validation instruments for information from interviews, focus groups, and surveys. They also provided objective sources of information regarding certain aspects of reintegration policies implementations (i. e. state of the Exit-Entry Check Points, available range of services there, etc).

## Experts on Policies of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories (Interviews)

This report provides brief conclusions organized by the topics of interviews and their top lines, namely: formulation of policies for reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas and Crimea, as well as roles, work, and coordination between all relevant authorities and the civil society; particular reintegration policies and specific bills, steps and measures aimed at different target audiences; certain issues of peacebuilding and national dialogue; information security, cultural aspect and communication of reintegration policies; international aspects of reintegration policy.

### ***On the involvement of NGOs into policymaking***

Although we can notice the increasing openness of relevant government agencies and greater involvement of NGOs into policymaking (primarily, drafting bills and legislative initiatives), the civil sector stressed the selectivity of such cooperation and the reluctance of relevant policymaking institutions to "share" the legislative initiative and ownership. At the same time, the informants noted that they are actively involved in cooperation with relevant authorities and into the legislative process. Still, they mentioned formality and superficiality of such cooperation.

*"When it is necessary to manipulate the situation in such a way as to obtain the desired result in the form in which they see it. Those experts are involved who either agree with this position or are used in this or that by-law or bill so that certain decisions are implemented exactly in the way the institution sees it".<sup>2</sup>(I7R7)*

*"Our state bodies still believe that only they have the competence to prepare draft decisions and, in fact, decisions. Although recently there has been a certain trend towards greater openness, communication with the public sector, fortunately. But there is still room for improvement".<sup>3</sup> (K1P1)*

As for the desired model of cooperation between NGOs and state institutions, the informants emphasized the role of the civil society sector as a source of expertise and constructive criticism, as "guardians" of democracy and democratic procedures, as an additional communicator, facilitator, and advocate of reintegration policies. This is crucial since the society may be unprepared for certain complex but necessary decisions in the interests of Ukraine, especially regarding transitional justice.

*"So, everything is very simple: it is not politicians who should form the agenda, but the society... NGOs should criticize - but constructively and with specific proposals"<sup>4</sup>. (K4R4)*

<sup>2</sup> "Коли треба зманіпулювати ситуацією таким чином, щоб отримати бажаний результат в тому вигляді, в якому вони його бачать. Залучаються ті експерти, які або погоджуються з цією позицією або використовуються в той чи інший підзаконний акт чи законопроект, ті чи інші рішення були реалізовані саме таким чином, як бачить його оця установа".

<sup>3</sup> "У нас державні органи все ще вважають, що лише вони мають компетенції готувати проекти рішень і, власне, рішення. Хоча останнім часом певний тренд до більшої відкритості, до комунікації з громадським сектором ми спостерігаємо, на щастя. Але тут все ще є що покращувати".

<sup>4</sup> "Значить, все дуже просто: не політики мають формувати адженду, а суспільство <...> ГО має займатися критикою – але критика, яка містить конкретну пропозицію".

"It makes no sense just to criticize, [there is] the need in monitoring [their] activities...<sup>5</sup>". (K5R5)

"The government should be more ready for dialogue with the public, with different circles of the public. It would be cool if the government had a strategy and initiated such a dialogue, but there may be [mutual] steps towards each other. Both the public and the authorities can initiate such discussions and should ideally be open to each other.<sup>6</sup>" (K1P1)

"We have developed (mainly due to the influence of donors) a civil society that believes that its task is to control. This is an important function of civil society. However, it [civil society] still has a function to make certain proposals, [suggest] certain decisions."<sup>7</sup> (I11R11)

## **On coordination between policy-making agencies in the sphere of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories**

We also discussed the institutional aspect of reintegration policy, namely the role, spheres of competencies, and coordination between relevant state institutions (Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories, the Permanent Representative of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, other ministries, National Security and Defense Council, relevant parliament committees, Presidential Office, Vice Prime Minister for Reintegration, etc.).

"I advocate for not a competition but cooperation with ministries/[governmental] bodies"<sup>8</sup> (K5R5)

"It's normal when relevant ministries and departments are responsible for certain sectors [or areas] of this massive load of work on reintegration. But coordination is needed here, of course <..> What I see is that we do not have a very good coordination between ministries and departments within the government. Decisions are made and communicated quite chaotically. Some decisions are not communicated at all. I'm not sure that there are communicators or strategies, in particular, in some ministries, although it remains to be seen."<sup>9</sup> (K1P1)

"The situation would be ideal if all these issues related to reintegration [and] de-occupation were indeed assigned to the Ministry of Reintegration and it would also be

<sup>5</sup> "Нема сенсу просто в критикуванні, потреба в моніторингу діяльності..."

<sup>6</sup> "Взагалі влада має бути більш готовою до діалогу з громадськістю, з різними колами громадськості. Було б взагалі круто якби влада мала стратегію і сама ініціювала б такий діалог, ну але тут можуть бути кроки назустріч один одному. І громадськість і влада можуть ініціювати такі обговорення і мають бути в ідеалі відкриті одне до одного".

<sup>7</sup> "У нас переважно під впливом донорів розвивалося громадянське суспільство, яке вважало, що його завдання - контролювати. Це важлива функція громадянського суспільства. Проте, все ж таки, у нього ще має бути функція виробляти якісь певні пропозиції, певні рішення".

<sup>8</sup> "Виступаю за те, щоб з міністерствами / органами ми не конкурували, а співпрацювали".

<sup>9</sup> "Я нормально ставлюся, що профільні міністерства, відомства беруть відповідальність за певні сектори цієї великої роботи реінтеграції. Але тут потрібна координація, звісно, зусиль <..> Те, що я бачу, – у нас не дуже добра координація між міністерствами та відомствами всередині уряду. Рішення приймаються, тим більше комунікуються досить хаотично. Деякі рішення не комунікуються взагалі. Я не впевнений, що є комунікаційники і стратегія, зокрема, у окремих міністерств, хоча треба з'ясувати."

a body both to coordinate and to execute them.<sup>10</sup> (K3P3)

It is worth noting that the generally positive assessments (of efforts) of the Ministry of Reintegration and the Representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea prevailed. At the same time, in the assessment of the activities of various state institutions (including the aforementioned) there were significant differences of opinions between informants, which may be explained by their areas of expertise and different levels and ways of involvement in reintegration, as well as political positions.

## ***On the content of reintegration policies and specific bills and measures to support certain target audiences***

The first draft law on the state policy during the transition period (the "first draft") was often criticized due to its certain articles and key provisions, especially on issues of transitional justice (amnesty, lustration, and the recognition of documents) being underdeveloped, fragmented. In general, all informants noted the importance of such a bill, although they criticized (often harshly) its certain provisions and articles and disagreed as to which parts of it were the most fundamental or the most problematic. At the same time, the view that the law should set a framework for reintegration policy was unanimous.

*"They combined both the positive and the problematic in one law. And it will be difficult to pass the vote. We'd rather divide it into several bills. That would be easier."*<sup>11</sup> (K1P1)

Much of the law concerned different issues of transitional justice. Thus, informants commented on particular elements of transitional justice, namely: amnesty, lustration, and documentation (right to truth). Also, they discussed the problem of several other registered projects of bill on collaborators as well as the use of such loaded terms and words. Opinions regarding the draft bills 'on collaborators' varied. An issue of correlation of these projects with the principles of transitional justice was raised.

*"That's why I once said that the law on collaborators is not a law on war. This is a law about peace, because you have to clearly tell people in those territories whether you will hold certain groups liable."*<sup>12</sup> (K4R4)

Finally, other key points of the law on the state policy of the transition period – elections and public administration and / or self-governance for temporarily occupied territories after reintegration were raised and discussed.

*"In order to stabilize life there, it will take several years before we will be able to proceed to the return of any democratic procedures, to talk about any local elections, and so on and so forth."*<sup>13</sup> (K1P1)

<sup>10</sup> "Ідеальна була б ситуація якби оці всі питання пов'язані з реінтеграцією, деокупацією, вони дійсно були покладенні на Мінреінтеграції і воно було б таким органом, який був би координаційним і виконавчим одночасно."

<sup>11</sup> "Вони поєднали і хороше, і проблемне в одному законі. І проголосувати за нього буде складно. Ми б пропонували розділити його на декілька законопроектів. Це було б простіше."

<sup>12</sup> "Тому я свого часу і казав, що закон про колаборантів - це закон не про війну. Це закон якраз про мир, бо ти маєш чітко сказати людям на тих територіях про те, чи будуть в тебе претензії до певних груп".

<sup>13</sup> "Для того, щоб стабілізувати там життя, потрібно буде декілька років перед тим, як ми зможемо перейти до повернення якихось демократичних процедур, про якісь місцеві вибори говорити, і так далі і тому подібне".

Some interviews were held after the “second draft” of the same legislation document had been uploaded for public discussion. It received a more positive evaluation from informants, partly due to its more conceptual and framework nature.

## On Communication Strategy

A separate line of discussion dealt with an issue of communication strategy for the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and the information and cultural components of reintegration policies. There was a unanimous opinion about the low efficiency of existing communication and information / informational security measures and policies. Similarly, almost all informants pointed out the need to use indirect means of influence and the so-called “soft power” in the information and cultural sphere. Some informants stated the need to decentralize and / or outsource communication campaigns, e. g. to the civic and private sectors to increase targeting and efficiency. Thus, the possible role of the civil society in information and cultural policy was also discussed. For example, there were ideas for conducting a kind of tender for NGOs to create content, promote it, and communicate key messages of reintegration policy.

*“I’m not sure if we have any comprehensive information policy at all <...> but some positive moments lately can also be noted”.<sup>14</sup> (K1R1)*

*“There is no effective communication. There is no information policy and communication policy of the state in this aspect is missing.” (I3R3)*

*“There are things for which just messages are not enough. They should be backed up by policy. Therefore, everything that concerns amnesty, collaborators - everything that concerns these concepts which have now become overgrown with populism, as well as everything that concerns some benefits, is exclusively a matter of communication.”<sup>15</sup> (I1R1)*

The issue of broadcasting on the frontline and to the temporarily occupied territories was also raised. In particular: coding of the signal of Ukrainian TV channels (necessity and possible solutions to provide access); DOM TV channel, its activity and expediency; the lack of Ukrainian high-quality content, especially entertainment products. Majority of informants were highly critical of the current broadcasting and content programming of DOM TV channel. Still, they emphasized the need of such an instrument targeted at the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and shared some ideas for it.

*“Now, people don't even watch Ukrainian satellite channels there, but watch what is free - Russian channels. Even in frontline areas. Now, if we turn on the TV and connect it to the satellite dish, we will most likely see Russian-language, Russian TV channels”.<sup>16</sup> (K1P1)*

<sup>14</sup> “Я не впевнений, чи взагалі у нас є якась цільна комплексна інформаційна політика <...> але певні позитивні моменти останнім часом теж можна відзначити”.

<sup>15</sup> “Є речі, для яких недостатньо просто меседжів. Це має бути підкріплено політикою. Тому все що стосується амністії, колаборантів, все, що стосується цього поняття, яке популізмом обросло зараз, все, що стосується якихось пільг - це винятково питання комунікації”.

<sup>16</sup> “Зараз люди навіть супутникові канали українські там не дивляться, а дивляться те, що безкоштовно – російські канали. Навіть на прифронтових територіях. Ми зараз, якщо вмикаємо телевізор та під’єднуємося до супутникової тарілки, то скоріш за все ми побачимо російськомовне, російські телеканали”.

*"The Ministry of Reintegration has opened a budget program on information independence. It is a source of funding for the DOM TV channel and for other events aimed at information reintegration. Perhaps these funds should be used more effectively by outsourcing an organization with a high-level of expertise. On a competitive basis. By maintaining certain legal procedures - that's how the whole world lives"<sup>17</sup>. (I14R14)*

## **On international dimension**

All informants noted that the lack of coordination and a 'one voice' (unison) positioning were the main challenge on the international level of reintegration policies and especially in the promotion of Ukraine's interests in the international arena and the opposing Russia's influence. At the same time, the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was positively characterized and some problematic points of interaction with international partners were outlined.

*"It is possible to end it [this conflict] only by creating conditions for Russia that will prevent its further expansion and attempts to hold these territories and destroy Ukraine or take it under complete control. It is about continuing to seek consensus at the global level on non-Russian foreign policy, strengthening economic sanctions against Russia and its political isolation, and supporting any movements within Russia aimed at changing the current government there"<sup>18</sup>. (K1P1)*

*"It would be very good if the relevant department was created in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which would take care of issues related to informing absolutely all countries regardless of their stances at the UN General Assembly. It is necessary to work with everyone: to persuade, to provide objective information, to counteract propaganda. But I do not see such a holistic approach. Civil organizations could help a lot in this"<sup>19</sup>. (K3P3)*

Informants also talked about the lack of resources for promoting Ukraine's own interests in the international arena while still suggesting various possible options. The importance of promoting own narratives and terminology / language / thesaurus to describe the conflict and events on the international arena was also emphasized.

*We have to promote our narratives, our messages in the information field. Of course, we must also influence the change of the lexicon/thesaurus used to describe the Ukrainian situation. We have to decide strategically how it should sound. Consolidat-*

<sup>17</sup> "Мінреінтеграції відкрило бюджетну програму про інформаційну незалежність. Там є якраз фінансування телеканалу «Дом» і фінансування інших заходів, покликаних на якраз отаку інформаційну реінтеграцію. Тому, можливо, ці кошти треба було б більш ефективно використати взявши на аутсорс організацію, яка б могла якісно формувати. Це ж конкурсна основа. Це проведення певних процедур законних - так весь світ живе".

<sup>18</sup> "Закінчити його [цей конфлікт] можна лише зробивши для Росії умови такі, які унеможливають її подальшу експансію і намагання втримати ці території та зруйнувати Україну або взяти її під цілковитий контроль. Мова про подальший пошук консенсусу на світовому рівні щодо неросійської зовнішньої політики, про посилення економічних санкцій стосовно Росії, про посилення політичної ізоляції і про підтримку будь-яких рухів всередині Росії, які спрямовані на зміну нинішньої тамтешньої влади".

<sup>19</sup> "Було б дуже непогано, якби в МЗС було створено відповідний департамент, який би опікувався питаннями, пов'язаними з інформуванням абсолютно всіх держав, незалежно від того, якої вони дотримуються позиції на засіданнях Генеральної асамблеї ООН. Працювати необхідно з усіма: переконувати, надавати об'єктивну інформацію, протидіяти пропаганді. Але я не бачу такого цілісного підходу. В цьому дуже сильно могли б допомогти громадські організації".

*ed and from different sides: the media, the public sector, and the government to offer these new and more correct definitions. It is very important. These are issues and discussions on interstate platforms of the UN, OSCE, PACE and so on. And this is a task for everyone who conducts some advocacy and information work with these bodies. In principle, the Foreign Ministry and part of the parliamentary corps have already been doing this. But I think it can be done more intensively. This can be done better. This can be done with the wider involvement of civil society experts. I think that now this resource is not involved effectively enough, not fully enough. It is necessary to coordinate the efforts of all those who have expertise, who have the desire and the strength to participate in this work to influence more effectively. (K1P1)<sup>20</sup>*

Finally, let us sum up informants' opinions on achievements and shortcomings of reintegration policies.

**Achievements** (all informants listed similar things):

- 1)** institutional component: activity (also development) of the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories and creation of the position of a Vice Prime Minister, strengthening of the role of the Representative of the President of Ukraine in Crimea, the launch of the Crimean Platform;
- 2)** more open discussion and adoption of strategies, bills (strategy of the de-occupation of Crimea, discussion of the bill on the transition period, etc.), greater involvement of civil society into these processes;
- 3)** particular steps to strengthen ties with TOT residents, to protect their interests and the interests of IDPs, to support these categories. Namely, opening of checkpoints (EECP), improvement of infrastructure, simplification of procedure of recognition / reception of documents, expansion of privileges for entrants from TOT (access to higher education), etc.

It is important, that the development of infrastructure, of the territories adjacent to the TOT, and the functioning of checkpoints (EECP) as a "showcase" for the residents of the temporarily occupied territories were also discussed as key points for effective communication of the benefits of living in Ukraine to the TOT residents that clearly demonstrated that these residents, their rights, and interests are important to Ukraine.

*"In general, it seems to me that the existence [i. e. formation] of the Ministry of Reintegration is also a victory".<sup>21</sup> (K2P2)*

*"The fact that the subject of Crimea is more actualized and the Crimean platform is being introduced. It's also [important] for the Crimean platform to have life beyond*

<sup>20</sup> "Ми маємо просувати свої наративи, свої меседжі в інформаційному полі. Звісно, що ми маємо впливати й на зміну лексики, який застосовується для опису української ситуації. Ми самі маємо визначитись стратегічно, як це має звучати. Консолідовано, з різних сторін: і медійники, і громадський сектор, і уряд пропонувати оці нові більш коректні визначення. Це дуже важливо. Це питання і дискусії на міждержавних платформах ООН, ОБСЄ, ПАРЕ і так далі. І це й завдання для всіх, хто веде якусь там адвокаційну, інформаційну роботу з цими органами. В принципі, МЗС і частина депутатського корпусу робить це і зараз. Але я думаю, що це можна робити більш інтенсивно. Це можна робити краще. Це можна робити і з ширшим залученням експертів з громадянського суспільства. Я думаю, що зараз цей ресурс залучений недостатньо ефективно, недостатньо повно. Треба координувати зусилля всіх, хто має експертизу, хто має бажання, сили брати участь у цій роботі, щоб впливати більш ефективно".

<sup>21</sup> "В цілому, мені здається, існування Міністерства реінтеграції – це теж перемога".

*the Summit. That it wouldn't be a one-time action. Then, as an achievement, but also in a work in progress: an improved infrastructure of EECPs, both in the Donetsk / Luhansk region and in Kherson".<sup>22</sup> (I4R4)*

**Shortcomings** (opinions on shortcomings and miscalculations of the reintegration policy were less unanimous, but key issues were repeated):

- 1) lack of institutional sustainability and long-term planning;
- 2) the lack of a consolidated position of all state institutions or at least its insufficient articulation. It was mentioned both as a problem at the international level and domestically – as a lack of internal coordination;
- 3) lack of expertise and professionalism of people and authorities involved in the formation and implementation of policies, lack of information "from the local level", "from the ground";
- 4) shortcomings regarding specific policies.

*"Inconsistency of our policy. An inconsistency not just because of the change of owners of high-ranking cabinets in the capital, but also [in policies and actions] of the same political authorities over several years, [this inconsistency is] sending contradictory, ambiguous messages to Ukrainian society. Incomprehensible to society. Similarly, such messages are incomprehensible to the international community. For our allies who also, say, sometimes tentatively but quite specifically point to the inconsistency of our policies".<sup>23</sup> (I2R2)*

Informants had different opinions regarding assessment of particular authorities and/or their roles. Particularly, the assessment of the role of the Presidential Office varied from sharply negative to positive.

Accordingly, the following priorities for reintegration policy were singled out: 1) maintaining ties with the residents of the temporarily occupied territories, 2) compensations for lost or damaged property, 3) documentation, 4) coordination and articulation of Ukraine's consolidated position on reintegration and 5) more efficient communication, information, and cultural policy.

*"Informing as widely as possible ... In general, the first thing – is to define, to articulate that those who remained on the other side of the line of contact are our citizens. Articulate for everyone: for those who stayed there, for those who moved, and for those who have not ... experienced the conflict at all".<sup>24</sup> (I8R8)*

<sup>22</sup> "Те, що більше актуалізована тематика Криму, і запроваджується Кримська платформа. Єдине, хотілось, щоб у Кримській платформі життя було далі і після Саміту. Щоб це не була одноразова акція. Потім, як здобуток, але ще також в процесі - це краще облаштування КПВВ, причому і в Донецькій/Луганській області, і в Херсоні".

<sup>23</sup> "Непослідовність нашої політики. Непослідовність, яка міняється не лише після зміни господарів високих кабінетів у столиці, а тою ж політичною владою упродовж кількох років, посилаючи суперечливі, неоднозначні меседжі українському суспільству. Незрозумілі для суспільства. Так само ці ж меседжі незрозумілі для міжнародної спільноти. Для наших союзників які також, скажемо, деколи стримуючись, але достатньо конкретно вказують на непослідовність нашої політики".

<sup>24</sup> "Якнайширше інформування... Взагалі перше - це визначити, проартикулювати, що ті, хто залишився по той бік лінії зіткнення - це наші громадяни. Проартикулювати для всіх: і для тих, хто там залишився, і для тих, хто переїхав, і для тих, хто взагалі ... не стикався з досвідом конфлікту".

Finally, the informants also commented on young people as a key target audience for reintegration policy. All surveyed experts were unanimous in this regard. The definition of the “fight for people” as a key task of reintegration policies was also unanimous and was often mentioned in precisely this wording (“боротьба за людей”).

*“Now our main struggle is for the youth, for the children who just started primary school...”<sup>25</sup>. (I20R20)*

*“Keeping in touch with people from the temporarily occupied territories. ... We are talking about EECs, frontline territories ... We are talking about the issuance of Ukrainian documents for those born in the occupied territories, passports. We are talking about access to education. Likewise, we are talking about information policy and how people in the occupied territories could consume or access Ukrainian content. Furthermore, we must shape the image of the people in a free Ukraine so that they want to return and not dehumanize the people here. But at the same time, we have a difficult task: we must defend ourselves at the same time... We just actually need to differentiate the enemy. The enemy is not on that territory - as usually in wars when the enemy is beyond the front line – for us the situation is different: we have an enemy there, but there are also our people. That's why I think it's the main strategy.”<sup>26</sup> (K2P2)*

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<sup>25</sup> “Зараз наша головна боротьба за молодь, за дітей, які в 1 клас пішли...”

<sup>26</sup> “Збереження зв'язків з людьми із тимчасово окупованих територій. ... Ми кажемо про обладнання КПВВ, прифронтових територій. Ми кажемо про видачу українських документів для тих, хто народився на окупованій території, паспортних документів. Ми кажемо про доступ до освіти. Ми кажемо про інформаційну політику і те, яким чином люди на окупованих територіях могли б споживати український контент або мати до нього доступ. Ми повинні формувати образ людей в, на вільній Україні, щоб вони хотіли повернення і не дегуманізували тут людей. Але одночасно в нас складна задача: ми повинні водночас оборонятися... Просто нам фактично потрібно розмежовувати ворога. Так, що ворог не на тій території – як зазвичай в війнах, що ворог за лінією фронту, – а в нас все не так: у нас ворог там, але там ще й наші люди. Тому я думаю, що це основна стратегія”.

# Public Opinion regarding Policies of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories

## ***On Geopolitics, International Relations and Partnerships, and Russia***

49.82% of Ukrainians think that international partners should be involved in the negotiations on the conflict in Donbas and Crimea. Whilst 36.62% are against their participation in such negotiations.

Absolute majority of respondents – 71% – agree that pressure from international organizations on Russia is necessary to return the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas under Ukrainian control (with 60.66% – completely agreeing with that). Only 17.51% disagree. Majority (56.62%) believe that Russia's international isolation will help to restore Ukraine's control over the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas. One fourth of respondents (26.25%) disagree.

Majority of Ukrainians (52.1%) are sure that Ukraine's membership in NATO will help to end Ukraine's war with Russia. Still, 30.83% disagree. There is also a wide support – 60.13% – for the idea that The United States should join the negotiation process for the settlement of the armed conflict in eastern Ukraine (namely, the Minsk Process and the Normandy format). While about one fourth of respondents (25.25%) do not support it.

Absolute majority of Ukrainians think that Ukraine should already raise the issue of the return of Crimea during international negotiations: 69.91% are completely sure of it and 10.43% – partially, totalling up to 80.34%. Eight times less – only 10.36% are against such an idea.

Majority (45.48% absolutely and 9.73% partially) also believe that it would be better, if Ukraine had nuclear weapons. Still, 25.58 completely disagree with this and 5.68% – partially.

Majority (47.84%) disagree that despite everything, economic relations, in particular trade, with Russia should be continued, while 34.42% are supporting this idea. Also, 46.81% believe that financial sanctions against individual Russians and Russian companies contribute to the end of the war. While about one third of respondents – 35.75 disagree.

Overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (75.26%) support the idea that Ukraine's foreign partners should force Russia to reimburse Ukraine for its losses, with 63.86% completely supporting it. Only 13.61% disagree (more than 5 times less).

## ***On War Scenarios***

Almost half of Ukrainians are sure (47.58%) that without a military operation, Ukraine will not be able to regain control of the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas. Still, 29.88% do not agree with this and another 19.38% neither agree nor disagree. Respondents in all macroregions except in the East agree that without a military operation, Ukraine will not

be able to regain control of the temporarily occupied territories of Donbas. Moreover, there is a clear trend present. The differences between those who agree and disagree go as such: West - 57,08% проти 19,67, North – 53,26% and 25,24%, Kyiv – 41,15% and 31,65%, Center – 49,87% and 27,15%, while in the East - 33,12% agree and 47,56% disagree. In the South the difference between a percentage of those who agree and disagree is on the verge of statistical significance: 40,63% agree and 37,24% disagree.

Similar results are regarding military operation in Crimea. 42.54% agree with the statement that without a military operation, Ukraine will not be able to regain control of the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea. Opposite opinion is held by one third of respondents (32.78%) while slightly above 20% neither agree nor disagree. The trend in regional responses is also similar to that of a previous question, though less pronounced. For example, the differences in Kyiv, Centre, and South are statistically non-significant, and for the rest of the regions the gaps between those who agree and disagree are smaller. That shows that people are more unsure about the situation with Crimea and that corresponding scenarios are less present in the media discourse.

## **On Administrative Statuses**

Absolute majority of respondents (68%) agree that if temporary administrations are established after de-occupation, they should be exclusively Ukrainian, i. e. without the participation of international organizations. Only 14.4% are of the opposite opinion. The idea of exclusively Ukrainian temporary administration is most welcome in Western Ukraine (74% for and 9% against), while in Kyiv (59,3% and 19%) and in the Eastern Ukraine (61,5% and 20,6%) the support is less pronounced.

Absolute majority of Ukrainians (60.96%) support the initiative to hold an all-Ukrainian referendum on the status of the temporarily occupied territories after de-occupation. Almost one fourth of respondents (23.39%) are against. There are no statistically significant differences between regions in answers to this question.

For the question “What should be the status of Crimea after the restoration of Ukrainian rule on the peninsula?”, the most popular answer chosen by over half of respondents (55.39%) was “Autonomous Republic (as before the occupation)”. One fifth (21.44%) chosen “Crimean Tatar autonomy”. Almost 17% answered “Normal oblast without special status”. It should be noted that only 1.14% stated that Crimea would not be returned to Ukraine. In all regions of Ukraine majority agree that after the restoration of Ukrainian government control in Crimea, the status of the peninsula should be the same as before occupation: East – 62,2%, South – 62,2%, Center – 56,1%, North – 53,8%, West – 49,6%, Kyiv – 46,8%. The numbers for the second popular alternative – the Crimean Tatar autonomy are: North – 26,1%, Kyiv – 25%, West – 24,5%, South – 19,6%, and East – 12,8%.

Majority (slightly over 60%) support the idea that Crimean Tatars should receive a separate representation (quota) in the Parliament of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, while 16.8% disagree and 15.03% neither agree nor disagree. The regional trends here are comparable to that of many other of our questions: most support in the West and Kyiv and comparatively less - in the South and East.

Over half of respondents (50.81%) support the idea that after de-occupation, certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts should have a special regime of local self- government.

One fourth is against (25.01%) and one fifth (19.15%) neither agree nor disagree. It is important to note here that the nature of such a 'special regime of local self-government' was not clarified and thus could have been understood differently by respondents.

Decisive majority of Ukrainians (52.8%) think that the "people's militia" mentioned in the Minsk agreements in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts may be created ONLY if it will patrol together with the National Guard of Ukraine. Another substantial number of respondents (34.53%) are sure that it may NOT be created under any circumstances. Only 6% think that it may be created and should operate without additional involvement of Ukrainian law enforcement agencies.

## ***On Information and Cultural Politics***

73% of respondents agree that Ukraine should promote the development of Crimean Tatar identity, language, and culture while only 12.85% are against. The support for this is unanimous in all regions. Still, it is greater in the West (82.9%), in Kyiv and Center (both - 73,9%). The comparatively lowest support, though still overwhelming, is in the East – 62.6%.

We also posed several questions on the consumption of mass media. Thus, 40% agree with the statement that "often (several times a week) I often see news or programs about Crimea". Equally, 40% are disagreeing with it. While in the Western Ukraine, in the North and in the Center there are more people who agree that they often (several times a week) see news or programs about Crimea, the situation is different in Kyiv, and in the South and East of Ukraine, where the majority disagree with the statement.

Regarding the attitude toward receiving information about events in Ukraine from the Russian media, absolute majority (62.1%) say that it is unacceptable. Around one fourth are of opposite opinion (that it is acceptable). Respondents in all regions agree that to get information about events in Ukraine from the Russian media is not acceptable. Still, there are some regional variations in the levels of support: while in the West and in Kyiv the difference between those who think it's acceptable and those thinking otherwise is almost three times, in the East and in the South it is only one-third.

Another question dealt with Russian entertainment programs. Majority (45.79%) think that it is unacceptable to watch and listen to entertainment programs of the Russian media. Still, a lot of people (37.25%) are of the opposite opinion and judge it acceptable. There are also regional differences in the level of agreement/disagreement with the statement "To watch and listen to entertainment programs of the Russian media is acceptable". Those who disagree prevail in Kyiv, West and North of Ukraine. Those who agree that "to watch such programs is acceptable" dominate in the South and in the East of Ukraine. In the Center of Ukraine the difference between the amount of people who agree and who disagree is statistically not significant.

Decisive majority (68.8%) of respondents support the idea that it is necessary to create more cultural products (films, books, TV series) about the events in Donbas and Crimea related to the occupation. Almost 15% disagree. People across all regions of Ukraine agree that it is necessary to create more cultural products (films, books, TV series) about the events in Donbas and Crimea related to the occupation, though the support is more pronounced in the West and North in Ukraine compared to East and South. Still, in all regions more than half of respondents agree with this statement.

To compare, almost half of respondents (47.82%) think that it is necessary to create and disseminate more actively computer games that would tell the truth about the occupation of Crimea and Donbas. Still, one third (34.46%) are against this. Only among the respondents from the Eastern Ukraine those who disagree with this statement prevail. Among respondents from the South the difference between those who agree and who disagree is not statistically significant.

Moreover, almost half of respondents (47.35%) are sure that Ukraine should create Russian-language media products (programs, films, talk shows, books, etc.) for the temporarily occupied territories. 34% are against such measures. There are significant differences between regions regarding this statement. Almost in all regions majority agree that such production of Russian-language media products is necessary: East (62,40% vs 22,05%), South (62,32% vs 19,63%), Kyiv (50,35% vs 29,60%), Center (47,70% vs 32,90%), and North (43,54% vs 33,12%). Only in the West of Ukraine most respondents disagree (29,21% who agree vs 53,96% who disagree).

43.94% of Ukrainians agree that during the transition period after de-occupation, decommunization measures should not be pushed on the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea and Donbas. Still, one fourth (24.95%) state an opposite position. There is also a regional trend comparable to previously mentioned in support for this statement: South (52,84% agree and disagree 17,41%), East (52,25% and 19,37%), Kyiv (45,28% and 27,93%), Center (46,39% and 22,33%), and North (39,34 and 25,06%). The West is the only region where those who disagree prevail: 32,58% agree and 35,14%, though it should be mentioned that this difference is not really statistically significant for the regional comparison.

## ***On Linkages with Residents of Temporary Occupied Territories of Ukraine***

More than half of respondents (52.79%) agree that Ukraine should restore economic relations with the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts). One third (33%) is against it. The restoration of economic relations with the occupied Crimea is supported by 50.43%, while 37.36% is against. In Kyiv the difference between supporters and opponents of restoration of economic relations with Donbas is statistically non-significant (43,41% against and 40,81% for), while regarding Crimea there is almost a 20% difference and opponents dominate (53,49% against and 34,87%). Almost the same situation is in the West of the country: the non-significant difference regarding Donbas (41,26% against vs 44,55% for) and opposition to restoration of economic relations with Crimea (54,74% against vs 45,74% for). Interesting to note that in the North majority is for the restoration of economic relations both with Donbas (49,34% for and 35,77% against) and with Crimea (48,03% for and 42,05% against). The results in the Center are similar: regarding Donbas 52,03% for and 31,91% against and regarding Crimea 49,53% for and 35,45% against. In the South and East of Ukraine the gap between numbers of supporters and opponents is much more pronounced and there are almost two-three times more supporters. Regarding restoration of economic relations with Donbas – in the South 63,38% for and 22,94%, in the East 66,07% and 24,1%. Regarding Crimea: in the South there are slightly less supporters – 60% for and 27,06% against, and in the East - 63,55% for and 24,93% against.

Absolute majority (61.34%, with 46.06% categorically) support that Ukraine should resume passenger transport connections with the occupied territories of Donetsk and Lu-

hansk oblasts. Only one fourth (26.55%) disagree. Likewise, 60.67% agree that Ukraine should resume passenger transport connections with the occupied Crimea, with about one fourth (27.31%) opposing this idea. All regions are unanimous in support of resuming passenger transport connections both with the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and with the occupied Crimea. It's not surprising that the level of such support is relatively smaller in Kyiv, West, and North and bigger in the South and East, though there is still at least 15% difference between supporters and opponents.

The respondents are of split opinion regarding the restoration of water supply to Crimea. 46% disagreed with the statement "The water supply to Crimea COULD NOT be restored", while 40.14% supported it and 11.27% neither agreed nor disagreed. There are regional differences regarding this question. In the North and Center the difference between supporters and opponents is not statistically significant. In Kyiv and in the West opponents of restoration of water supply prevail: 53,2% and 50,65% vs 32,53% та 36,79% respectively. Contrarily, in the South and East of Ukraine the majority support the restoration of water supply to occupied Crimea: 57,02% and 63,16% vs 29,89% and 24,96% respectively.

Absolute majority (56.53%) agree that after de-occupation, special conditions for taxation and investment should be established in the whole of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in order to overcome the economic consequences of the occupation. Still, 17.92% disagree with such measures. All regions unanimously support such policy with comparable results: 52-57% for and around 17% against.

Absolute majority (65.44%) support the idea that Ukraine should provide financial support to enterprises and businesses affected by the occupation. About 15% are against such measures. There are no regional differences in the levels of support.

Majority of respondents (46.04%) are against Ukraine (after de-occupation) paying compensation for the property of citizens destroyed as a result of hostilities. Whilst 35.35% are for such reimbursements. Only in the East (55,35% vs 26,51%) and South (43,71% vs 35,25%) of Ukraine majority of respondents agree that Ukraine should pay compensation for the property of citizens destroyed as a result of hostilities. In all other regions the opponents prevail: in the North (33% for and 49,07% against), in Kyiv (30,23% for and 53,08% against), and in the West (26,01% for and 57,21% against).

Overwhelming majority is sure (86.49%, with 78.54% – completely) that after de-occupation, Russia should pay compensation to Ukrainian citizens for their property destroyed as a result of hostilities. Only about 5% disagree with this. There are no regional differences in support of this idea.

Similarly, the absolute majority of respondents (69.7%) agree that after de-occupation, the Ukrainian authorities should facilitate, including financially, the return of internally displaced people to the temporarily occupied territories. Only 7.49% are of the opposite opinion. There are also no regional differences in support of this idea.

## **On Education**

Absolute majority (56.02%) support that Ukraine should recognize all secondary education documents issued in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas during the occupation. While two times less (27.47%) respondents are against it. Furthermore,

51.67% support that Ukraine should recognize all higher education documents issued in the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas during the occupation. 32.06% are of the opposite opinion.

Majority of respondents across all regions of Ukraine agreed with recognition of secondary education certificates. Not surprising the support in the East and South of Ukraine is greater (70,42% and 66,39% vs 15,56% and 18,68%). In the West of Ukraine (48,04% for and 36,02% against) and in Kyiv (49,98% for and 32,84% against) the support is comparatively the smallest.

Comparatively to the previous question, there are more regional differences in supporting the policy toward the recognition of higher education documents (universities / colleges). In Kyiv those who are against the recognition are in majority (39,33% for and 44,84% against). In the North there is almost 8% difference in favour of recognition (- 43,94% vs 36,08% against) and in the West – the difference is around 16% (45,81% vs 39,39%). In the Center it's 50,3% vs 31,81%. It is expected that in the South and the East of Ukraine there are almost three times more supporters compared to opponents: 62,67% and 65,88% vs 23,1% and 19,29% respectively.

More than half of respondents (59.57%) agree that after de-occupation, applicants from uncontrolled territories (NGC) should have preferences when entering Ukrainian higher education institutions during the transition period. Three times less people (20.9%) are against it. Ukrainians in all regions are unanimous in their support of such a policy. There is no region where the ratio between supporters and opponents is less than twice in favour of the former (Kyiv), and in most regions it is even bigger.

## ***On Dialogue***

Overwhelming majority is sure (85.3%, with 69.61 being absolutely sure) that it is already necessary to establish a dialogue with ordinary residents of the temporarily occupied territories. Only 6.02% disagree. There is an overwhelming and unanimous support for such dialogue across all regions of Ukraine.

## ***On Amnesty and Transitional Justice***

Majority of respondents (41.94%) support the statement that the amnesty should be applied to all former members of illegal armed groups of "LPR / DPR" who have NOT committed serious crimes. Still, 36.22% are against this, which makes the public opinion on this issue indecisive. Only in Kyiv and in the West of Ukraine the percentage of those who disagree with the statement is bigger than those who agree: 41,15% vs 32,28% and 44,77% vs 33,43% respectively. In the North the difference is statistically non-significant: against – 38,42% and for – 40,29%. In all other regions the ratio is opposite and supporters prevail: in the East 53,29% agree and 25,49% disagree, in the South - 48,49% and 30,07%, and in the Center - 43,42% and 35,28%.

The opinions whether the members of illegal armed groups of "LPR / DPR" who have NOT committed serious crimes (torture, hostage-taking, murder or wounding of civilians or prisoners of war) should be released from liability are split: 41.54% are supporting this idea with 36.06% - opposing. Not surprisingly, there are similar regional differ-

ences and trends as to the previous question.

45.26% agree that residents of the temporarily occupied territories who received a Russian passport and took part in the armed conflict in Donbas but did not commit serious crimes should be amnestied. Still, around one fourth (24.03%) neither agree nor disagree, and another 28.58% disagree with this. For this question the ratio between those who agree and who disagree is in favour of the former in all regions, though in Kyiv and in the West it is not statistically significant with almost one-third going for each of the options. In the North and Center there are around 10% more of those who agree (approx. round 44% vs 30%). In the South the difference is 52,95% vs 21,07%. Finally, in the East the gap is even more profound – 59,41% agree and 16% disagree.

Overwhelming majority of Ukrainians (73.45%) agree that all those who belonged to the illegal armed groups of "LPR / DPR" should be liable. Even more, strongly agree 58.81%. Only 11.59% disagree. All regions are unanimous in favour of this policy. The greatest level of support is in Kyiv (79,05% vs 8,02%) with North, West, and Center closely following and comparable. There is comparatively less support in the South (67,89% vs 14,97%) and in the East (57,44% vs 18,07%). Still, those who support the liability for members of illegal armed groups are in significant majority.

Absolute majority of respondents (77,18% with 65.30% - completely) support the idea that Russian citizens who took part in the armed conflict in Donbas should be liable and not subject to amnesty. Only 10.83% are of the opposite opinion. Such support is unanimous across all regions of Ukraine. The greatest level of support for this idea is in Kyiv (83,90% vs 4,47%) and the smallest – in the East (64,16% vs 14,07%). Though even in the East the agree/disagree balance is 50% and signify an overwhelming support for such a measure.

Majority of Ukrainians – almost half, 48.57% – agree that it is necessary to design employment programs in the civil sector for former members of the illegal armed groups of "LPR / DPR" who will be subject to amnesty. Two times less – 24.55% disagree with such measures and another 23.35% neither agree nor disagree. In all regions, the majority of respondents agree with this policy. It is not surprising that the support in the East and South of Ukraine is greater than in the West and in the Center. Still, the difference in favour of such employment programs is significant and more than 13% even in the West.

Furthermore, over half of respondents (54.19%) agree that special programs for former members of illegal armed groups of "LPR / DPR" aimed at re-adjustment to civilian life, including educational and psychosocial ones, should be created. One fourth – 26.11% are against and another 16.36% neither agree nor disagree. On average around half of respondents in each region support an idea of such programs with around 30% disagreeing. Still, the support is slightly more profound in the East and South where the ratio is 61% agreeing to 16-21% disagreeing.

Regarding the funding of such programs, 40.67% support the statement that special programs aimed at re-adjustment to civilian life for former members of the illegal armed groups of "LPR / DPR" should be funded by Ukraine's international partners. Still, one thirds of respondents (34.43%) express an opposite opinion. Only in the West of Ukraine majority of respondents disagree that such programs should be financed by international donors.

Decisive majority (60.13%) are sure that special programs aimed at re-adjustment to civilian life for former members of the illegal armed groups of "LPR / DPR" should be fund-

ed by Russia. Three times less people (20.14%) are against it. The support for this idea is unanimous across all regions of Ukraine. Even in the East the difference between agree / disagree answers is 20%.

## ***On Dialogue***

Majority – almost half of respondents (47.84%) – state that they are not ready to take part in the local joint round tables with former members of the illegal armed groups of "LPR / DPR" to resolve specific issues. Still, more than one third (35.54%) think that they are up to such a task. Thus, respondents in all regions are mostly against dialogue and a 'joint round tables' with former members of the illegal armed groups of "LPR/DPR". The most radical are those in Kyiv (with 56.19% against vs 25.03% for). Still, even in the East and South where the differences are the smallest, they are still statistically significant (44% against vs 39.5% for).

## ***On Lustration and Liability***

Absolute majority (71.2%) of Ukrainians agree that those citizens of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territories who have obtained a Russian passport, i.e., Russian citizenship, should renounce it after de-occupation. Even more, 63% absolutely agree with this. At the same time, 15.5% are against it. The regional distributions of answers to this question are similar to previous. More than 55% in each region agree with such an approach: from 57.2% in the East and 61.9% in the South to 74.8% in the North and 80.4% in the West. Likewise, the number of opponents varied from 24.2% in the East and 20.3% in the South to 15% in the North and 9.5% in the West.

Similarly, absolute majority (66.1%, with 52.3% decisively) support an idea that Ukraine should impose sanctions on foreigners who have illegally moved to the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Only 16.2% are against this. In regional distributions of answers to this question the same pattern is followed. The level of support is comparatively bigger in the West, Center, North, and Kyiv and smaller in the East and South, though still more than 50% support such sanction.

Decisive majority of respondents (58.8%) agree that Ukraine should provide employment programs for those who will be subject to lustration after de-occupation to avoid unemployment. 17.65% are opposing this measure. Though across all regions of Ukraine majority support the introduction of such programs, the level of support is much more pronounced in the East and South: there are five-six times more supporters there than opponents, while in the rest of regions the difference is two-three times.

Absolute majority of respondents (69.3%, with 53.3% completely) support that after de-occupation, teachers who worked in schools in the temporarily occupied territories should undergo additional checks. Still, 18% are against such additional checks. More than half of respondents in all regions support this idea. Not surprisingly, the lowest support is in the East and South: 53,1% and 58,3% for vs 32% and 27,2% against.

There is overwhelming support (74.2%) for an idea that after the de-occupation, workers of the "LPR/DPR" media should be liable. Even more, 59.6% completely agree with this, while only 12.1% express the opposite opinion. There are two times more supporters for

such a measure among respondents from the East, three times more – in the South, and seven-eight times more across the rest of regions. Surprisingly, less people, though still over half (56.9%), are sure that after de-occupation, only the leadership of the "LPR/DPR" media should be liable. 26.45 disagree with this statement. People in Kyiv and in the East demonstrate less support for the statement that only the leadership of the "LPR/DPR" media should be liable after de-occupation compared to respondents in other regions.

Absolute majority of Ukrainians – over two thirds (70.7%) approve that after de-occupation, middle-level managers of municipal enterprises (e.g., water, transport or power companies, hospitals) and local administrations should undergo additional checks. More than half (51.4%) – completely approve such measures, while only 16.7% are against them. Again, the lowest support is in the East and South: 54,7% and 64,6% for vs 29,8% and 21,3% against.

Respondents also overwhelmingly (68.3%) support the statement that following the de-occupation of Donbas, people working in local "LPR / DPR" administrations should not be allowed to work in the civil service in Ukraine. Out of it, 55,1% agree with it completely with only 15.6% holding opposite views. There is decisive support for this approach across all regions, though to a different degree. In the West – 78,2% for and 9,4%, In North and Center – 71% for and 13% against, in Kyiv 64,7% for and 10,7% against. Finally, comparatively lower levels of support are in the South – 60% for and 22,2% against, and in the East – 54,8% for and 28,5% against (though the difference is still two times).

Likewise, 67.8% agree that following the de-occupation of Crimea, people working in occupation local administrations should not be allowed to work in the civil service in Ukraine. Furthermore, 54.5% completely agree with this, whilst only 15.8% are against. Regional trends and results for this question are very similar to those of the previous question regarding Donbas.

Overall, on the question of lustration there is a general trend that the level of support for such measures is lower in the South and East of Ukraine compared to the rest of Ukrainian regions.

## **On Elections**

A decisive majority (54.24%) agree that elections to local authorities should take place no earlier than five years after de-occupation. A bit over 20% disagree, 20% not sure.

Furthermore, almost two thirds of Ukrainians (65.18%) are sure that the right of residents of the temporarily occupied territories to run for the Ukrainian Parliament should be limited for a certain period. Against such limitations around 20% with 14% - decisively. Still, Ukrainians are indecisive on the question regarding the possible limitations to the right to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections for residents of the temporarily occupied territories. While 51.49% think that it should be "the same as for all other citizens of Ukraine, i.e., not limited", another 46.45% think that it should be "limited for a certain period".

## Public Opinion In-Depth: Analysis of Focus Groups

This review sums up discussion held on twenty (20) focus groups with representatives of target audiences: IDPs, residents of target regions, students and university graduates who are IDPs, people who often crossed the contact line etc. All discussions followed the same guide. Their duration varied from 40 min to more than 100 min.

### *On the understanding of concepts*

Over the course of discussions, it became apparent that there is a lack of articulation of the concepts related to reintegration policies at the level of public and media discourses. People operated rather with 'dictionary' definitions rather than their particular meanings implied by these policies. For example: transition period was defined as a period between one state and another, reintegration – as assembling of something that was broken apart before. Also there was much confusion about 'special status'. Participants noted that 'they do not feel' reintegration policy themselves.

*"For me, reintegration is the reunification of something that once fell apart"<sup>27</sup>. (Donetsk region, female)*

*"I remember the transitional period - when everyone moved, and we had difficulties with the documents. It was this period that was called the transition period and [they] used it as explanation for all problems"<sup>28</sup>. (Lviv region, male)*

On the other hand, words / concepts related to transitional justice brought more heated discussion. Majority of people articulated a rather unforgiving stance on the questions of amnesty and justice. Still, there were those of opposite positions and in a couple of focus groups such an opposite position prevailed. Regarding lustration, the general consensus was that it should only be applied to the top level / leadership of occupied administrations and never to 'ordinary people' especially medical doctors or teachers. Justice was understood as mainly retributive and as the principle of 'on an equal / general' basis.

*"Those who took part directly in hostilities, committed war crimes, were involved in the seizure of power, this coup. Of course, they are criminals and no amnesty can be applied to them. And I believe that the people in power there, so to speak, they also cannot be granted this amnesty, because they promoted the separation of these territories - Crimea and Donbass from Ukraine and committed illegal crimes. And people who are civilians - they are not guilty, I think. An amnesty should be applied to them"<sup>29</sup>. (Donetsk region, female)*

<sup>27</sup> "Для меня реинтеграция - это объединение чего-то, что когда-то распалось".

<sup>28</sup> "Я помню, что переходной период - когда все переехали и были у нас сложности с документами. Именно этот период называли переходным и им объясняли все проблемы".

<sup>29</sup> "Ті люди, звичайно, які брали участь безпосередньо у військових діях, вчиняли військові злочини, були причетні до захоплення влади, цього перевороту. Звичайно що вони є злочинцями і до них не може бути застосована ніяка амністія. І я вважаю, що люди які знаходяться при владі, скажімо так, там, на них також не може бути розповсюджена ця амністія, тому що вони пропагандують відділення цих територій - Криму і Донбасу від України, і вчиняють незаконні злочинні дії. А люди які цивільні - вони не винні, я вважаю. До них повинна бути застосована амністія".

Probably the hardest to discuss was the concept of reconciliation. In Ukrainian it is usually translated as “примирення” which literally means ‘making peace’ and thus has a slightly different connotation. Some people emphasized that while they might be ready to listen and tolerate, they might not be ready to ‘make peace’.

*“It is possible that some people will reconcile with each other, but only if they are close relatives. Those who have lost someone - they will not achieve any reconciliation”<sup>30</sup>. (Donetsk region, female)*

## **On attitudes toward IDPs**

More than half of all focus groups were either wholly with IDPs or had some IDPs participating. Thus people shared a lot of personal stories and experiences, especially from the times when they relocated to ‘free Ukraine’. These stories contained both positive examples of supportive measures and initiatives aimed at IDPs of different kinds (state and non-governmental) and negative experiences. International / non-governmental programs got better reviews. Participants noted that compared to previous / early years, there are fewer support programs now. In general, IDPs’ focus groups had a rather pragmatic and materialistic mode of discussion compared to others.

*“And we were just brushed aside with these miserable “kopeyki”. To be honest, international foundations helped a lot more when they announced their programs. We won grants to start a business. It is great when you are given start-up capital. Even a few thousand dollars, but it is enough to start a small business”<sup>31</sup>. (Lviv region, female)*

Talking about current issues and challenges, participants mentioned: 1) problems with housing and available support programs as the most pressing; 2) the need for more programs aimed at employment and education (including those to get a new qualification for older people); 3) the lack of information and inefficient communication for available support programs for IDPs.

Many IDPs participants mentioned instances of discrimination / stigmatization they either witnessed or were subjected to. While focus groups do not allow for generalizations, in our research those from Donbas reported more such instances, while IDPs from Crimea more often said that they met only with a positive attitude. Still, more research here is needed.

Opinions varied on the question whether people maintained connection with TOT. It was mainly true for those who had close family members there. Around two thirds of participants who are IDPs said that they won’t return after the de-occupation. Still, it is necessary to note that there were people who said that they will consider returning ‘to do their part’ to help reintegration after de-occupation.

*“We won't go back. We are already used to living here. We already have a job and a household here”<sup>32</sup>. (Donetsk region, female)*

<sup>30</sup> “Возможно кто-то между собой помирится, но из разряда близких родственников. Те, кто кого-то потерял, те никакого примирения не достигнут”.

<sup>31</sup> “И от нас просто отмахнулись вот этими несчастными копейками. Честно говоря, гораздо больше помогли международные фонды, когда они объявляли о своих каких-то программах. Мы выигрывали гранты на открытие предпринимательства. Это классно, когда тебе дают стартовый капитал. Пускай несколько тысяч долларов, но это достаточно, чтобы начать малый бизнес”.

<sup>32</sup> “Мы назад уже не вернёмся. Мы уже тут привыкли. У нас тут уже и работа, и хозяйство”.

*"After de-occupation, of course, I plan to [return]. I will have to go back and return Crimea to the legal field, to the cultural field of Ukraine"<sup>33</sup>. (Kherson region, male)*

## **On attitudes toward residents of temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine**

Majority of participants empathized with residents of temporary occupied territories of Ukraine. Those who communicated with them (friends, relatives) often remarked that a lot of people there just can't relocate for different reasons and are unwillingly living there. Still, some stigmatization could be felt, even if it was not articulated.

Participants remarked on different hardships of living there (on the TOT): various repressive measures (wi-fi by passport / id, censored Internet, commandant hours), drastic situation with medical system there, etc.

The need to support these people by helping with receipt of Ukrainian documents as they are 'the same Ukrainian citizens as we are' was often mentioned. Also, the problems with crossing the contact line and thus going through Russia after the EECP were almost completely shut down by occupation authorities was discussed.

*"I think of course we should simplify the procedure for issuing any documents. For the moment, of course, simplify the crossing [of contact line] back and forth"<sup>34</sup>. (Luhansk region, male)*

## **On information, cultural, and communication aspects of reintegration policies**

Majority of participants outright said that they are tired of news and try not to watch or read them. Still, they demonstrated a sufficient level of involvement to discuss the matters in detail.

Participants hold a low opinion of Ukraine's information and communication policies: they see them as weak, not up to combating Russian influences in media spheres. For example, many pointed out the coding of the satellite signal and how it led to people on the TOT to lose access to Ukrainian channels ('They are watching only Russian TV now'). Similarly, many noted that for them personally coding had been also a problem.

*"And in general I think that even if the Ukrainian channels were to work without interference in that territory, the information that the state [Ukraine] gives about those territories, about those people - it is nothing at all. There is no information about the state's support for them, nothing like "We have not forgotten about you", "We are trying to solve this problem".<sup>35</sup> (Luhansk region, male)*

<sup>33</sup> "После деокупации, естественно, я планирую. Придется возвращаться и возвращать Крым в правовое поле, в культурное поле Украины".

<sup>34</sup> "Я считаю, конечно, надо упростить процедуру выдачи любых документов. На данный момент, конечно, упростить проезд туда-сюда".

<sup>35</sup> "И вообще считаю, что даже если бы спокойно работали украинские каналы на той территории, то информация, которую дает государство насчёт тех территорий, насчёт тех людей - она вообще никакая. Нет информации о какой-либо поддержке государства для них, в том плане, что там "Мы про вас не забыли", "Мы стараемся решить эту проблему".

Participants (quite often) pointed out the necessity for the (contra)propaganda aimed at TOT as well as the need to exercise a more differentiated approach: mainly to employ soft power and power of social media and wider usage of digital platforms (YouTube). Regarding the 'DOM' TV channel, the majority had not even heard of it.

Regarding commemoration practices, people were positive that 'new Ukrainian heroes' should be recognised and remembered. Almost in every group, participants also said that there should be more memorials for ordinary people and non-combatants / civilian victims. On the matter of decommunization, participants were wary and did not see it as a pressing matter.

*"Every city has its own heroes, whose names can be used to name streets, organize memorial days, and so on"<sup>36</sup>. (Luhansk region, male)*

## **Vision of the Future**

There is no clear vision. For example, people both said that they can't envision the results of reintegration, but then were ready to discuss particulars of this process and future in 5 or 10 years.

The de-occupation of Crimea was seen as less realistic or further away in future and more problematic, than de-occupation of Donbas. All participants were sure that 'Russia does not really need Donbas' unlike Crimea.

*"It seems to me that Crimea is harder to return, and I just don't see scenarios."<sup>37</sup>  
(Donetsk region, male)*

*"I don't even want to talk about Crimea. It's unrealistic."<sup>38</sup> (Kherson region, male)*

Participants were also rather sceptical regarding the reconciliation process.

<sup>36</sup> "В каждом городе есть свои герои, именами которых можно назвать улицы, дни памяти устраивать...".

<sup>37</sup> "Мені здається, що Крим важче повернути, і я просто не бачу сценаріїв".

<sup>38</sup> "За Крым даже не хочу говорить, это нереально".

## Conclusion

Since 2014, the Ukrainian authorities have done significant work on reintegration. On the one hand, the institutional groundwork for reintegration has been laid: a substantial legal framework has been established (from strategic documents to procedures and regulations) and the operation of key responsible bodies (from the relevant ministry to a special unit in the Prosecutor General's Office) has been set up. On the other hand, the Ukrainian authorities managed to achieve results in supporting internally displaced persons: they were given the opportunity to vote in local elections, several housing acquiring programs were created, preferential conditions for admission to higher education institutions were introduced, and so on. An equally important component of the state's activity is the discussion of sensitive issues of reintegration (especially in the area of transitional justice) with the expert community and civil society. It is also important to note that some issues pertaining reintegration and temporary occupied territories of Ukraine become more articulated in media and in the public discourse which might be observed by a consistently lower percentage of those who find it hard to answer the relevant question in public opinion surveys in 2021 than in 2019.

At the same time, the reintegration policy is complex and therefore requires the accommodation of a large number of issues as well as further steps and solutions, including:

- **emphasis on the "fight for the people" as a fundamental principle and the core of the policy of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories.** This includes both transitional justice and measures to support internally displaced persons and young people from the temporarily occupied territories, including compensations for lost property and damage. The citizens of Ukraine who now live on the temporary occupied territories of Ukraine should feel that they have not been forgotten; that the state, as far as possible, cares for them and protects their rights; that they are important to Ukraine.
- **adherence to the principles of evidence-based policy.** The policymaking and drafting of all bills should be carried out in cooperation with relevant organizations and experts, based on up-to-date survey data and research, and taking into account international experience, including negative ones. It is also important to combine qualitative and quantitative methods to get the detailed and nuanced results. Also, the public opinion on a particular topic or policy should not necessarily be a roadmark but rather a symptom of a diagnosis that those who design and formulate policies should be aware of and should work with.
- **taking into account both long-term goals and state / national interests, as well as public opinion** in policy making. It is necessary not to flirt with the population fuelling populist sentiments, but to build an effective communication policy, especially on such sensitive issues of transitional justice as amnesty, lustration, and liability for one's actions, etc.
- **critical analysis of international experience.** It is important to approach international experience not as ready-made solutions and model scenarios that may be borrowed, but as a set of specific tools and measures that must be critically analyzed and applied considering the specifics of our context. It is necessary not only to focus on best practices, but also to analyze failures.

- **adoption of strategic documents on reintegration.** First of all, these are the framework “On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period”, Strategies for Reintegration and Information Policy for the Temporarily Occupied Territories until 2025 and Action Plans for their Implementation, the Information Security Strategy, the Foreign Policy Strategy, and the regulatory framework for settling property issues in the temporarily occupied territories. Ratification of the Rome Statute is also important.
- **increasing the level of coordination between various state bodies** that prepare policy documents on reintegration policy. This includes coordinating and intensifying the efforts of all state institutions to eliminate inconsistencies in existing regulations and laws.
- **cooperation with civil society.** There is a need for greater involvement of civil society into working groups and expert discussions on the development of policies and laws related to reintegration. To emphasize, it is civil and human rights organizations that systematically form the agenda for the development and drafting of reintegration policies, actualize certain issues for protection of rights and freedoms, and are a source of constant constructive criticism for the government.
- **advancing and completing already initiated institutional reforms.** First, it is the decentralization reform and reforms of law enforcement and judicial bodies as well as the strengthening of defence capabilities. Successful and visible institutional reforms are an additional argument for Ukraine in the process of reintegration and its "fight for people" from the temporarily occupied territories.

# Recommendations for Policies of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories

## On Strategic Level

1. To standardize terminology used in the strategic documents on reintegration using the "Glossary of Names, Terms and Phrases Recommended for the Usage regarding the Temporary Occupation by the Russian Federation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol and Certain Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts" compiled by the Council for National Security of Ukraine (RNBO).
2. The Ministry of Reintegration: to articulate and harmonize at the level of national legislation the concepts of "reintegration" and "transition period" indicating: clear and precise framework and conditions and realistic time frames for the latter in its conflict and post-conflict phases; criteria for suitable division of competencies between authorities; orders and conditions for self- government and/or temporary international administrations; and administrative statuses of the temporarily occupied territories after their de- occupation.
3. The national authorities: to be guided by a broad definition of "reintegration", which focuses not only for the temporarily occupied territories, but also on the population of other regions of Ukraine. Also, a broad definition of "reintegration" includes issues of "transitional justice", "peacebuilding", "post- conflict settlement", and a broad public dialogue on their principles.
4. The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and the Presidential Office: to harmonize the strategic vision of the process of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Namely: if a decision is made for the unified approach to the reintegration policy of all temporarily occupied territories, then it should be reflected in the relevant documents (for example, the strategy of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and action plans for its implementation). Instead, now a separate "Strategy of de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol" with a plan of action has been approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine №117 / 2021, March 24, 2021. This falls out of the logic of a unified approach to all temporary occupied territories of Ukraine. Therefore, strategic documents and action plans for reintegration should be aligned and designed to avoid creation of a large number of strategic documents.
5. Ministry of Reintegration: to develop a strategy for de-occupation and reintegration of certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions and a corresponding action plan replacing the "Action Plan aimed at implementing some principles of state domestic policy for certain districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, where Ukrainian authorities temporarily do not exercise their powers" approved by the order №8-p of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on January 11, 2017. A new document should include a chapter on informational, cultural, and other aspects of reintegration. It must also be aligned with the already approved strategic documents, in particular "The Information Security Strategy" approved by the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine on October 15, 2021.

6. The Ministry of Reintegration: to introduce inclusive discussions on the most important decisions on reintegration policies with the involvement of representatives of region (oblast and rayon) state administrations (and rayon military-civilian administrations) and local self-government bodies (and city military-civilian administrations) of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson oblasts. It is important that such communication is not limited to the regional (oblast) level. Such inclusive discussions may be in the form of a quarterly meeting of the officials / leadership of the Ministry of Reintegration, the Presidential Office, and representatives of local authorities and self-government bodies of Donetsk, Luhansk and Kherson regions. Within such a meeting the representatives of the central government should present both already adopted decisions / solutions and planned decisions or drafts, as well as receive feedback from local officials and discuss the challenges of implementation of decisions of the central government in the local context.
7. To Authorities / government bodies: systematically involve civil sector experts and think tanks in the development, design, and discussion of draft legislations.

### ***On Policies Aimed at Internally Displaced Persons***

8. The Ministry of Digital Transformation in cooperation with the Ministry of Reintegration: to expand the list of electronic services available for IDPs. Especially, such as: (1) notification of the authorized body on the change of address of actual residence, (2) termination of the status of internally displaced person (with termination of stipend / benefits if applicable).
9. The Ministry of Reintegration in cooperation with the Ministry of Economy: to expand support for IDPs' small and medium-sized enterprises through microcredit programs, soft and interest-free lending, a simplification of permitting system, possible tax holidays, and grant programs. Similar programs should be implemented by local governments.
10. International donors: to renew / extend IDPs' small and medium business support programs.
11. The Ministry of Reintegration: to implement differentiated programs to support IDPs based on the needs of certain categories. For example, for IDPs of working age – these should primarily be employment, business support and mortgage programs, while for IDPs of retirement age – the focus should be on social housing programs.
12. The Ministry of Reintegration: to audit existing housing programs for IDPs in order to increase their level of funding.
13. The Ministry of Reintegration, the Ministry of Social Policy and local self-government bodies should directly inform and address internally displaced persons about the benefits available to them and the measures/programs relevant to them (i.e., through the application "Diia" (Дія), mailing lists).

### ***On Policies aimed at TOT Residents***

14. The Ministry of Reintegration and the Ministry of Digital Transformation: to develop and expand digital services available to citizens of Ukraine living in the temporarily occupied territories to facilitate for them the procedures for obtaining Ukrainian documents. A step in that direction is an introduction of a procedure for obtaining a birth certificate through the Electronic Court and a 'eBaby' (eМалюток) service in the application 'Diia' (Дія).

15. The Ministry of Reintegration in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Science: to conduct a comprehensive analysis of programs aimed at preparation for admission and at admission of entrants (high school graduates) from the temporarily occupied territories to Ukrainian Higher Education Institutions (Universities, Colleges, etc.) over the past three years. Based on the results of this analysis, to optimize such programs.
16. The Ministry of Reintegration: to continue the program of upgrading the EECPP equipping them with service areas (administrative services, medical services, bank, post office, etc.).
17. Ministry of Culture and Information Policy (MCIP) and the Ministry of Reintegration: to use targeted advertising on the TOT of Ukraine (for example, there are algorithms for "bypassing" international sanctions against Crimea in order to launch targeted advertising campaigns on Facebook and Instagram). Also, it may be necessary to raise the issue of targeted advertisement for these regions at the level of official communication on behalf of Ukraine with the central offices of Facebook (Meta), Google, etc.
18. The Ministry of Reintegration and the State Enterprise "Multimedia Platform of Foreign Broadcasting of Ukraine": to target more precisely the information and entertainment program policy of the "Dom" channel on the residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and their interests, problems, and concerns. In particular, by focusing the TV channel's promo campaigns on target audiences (i. e., residents of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and adjacent areas) and not throughout Ukraine (i. e., avoiding spending resources on billboards in Kyiv, Dnipro, etc.).
19. The central narratives in communication with residents of TOT should be: "You are our co-citizens", "We are waiting for you", "We are ready to support you", "Ukraine Means Opportunities", "Together we will overcome everything".

## **On Transitional Justice**

20. Compensation for destroyed or damaged property of legal entities and individuals should be based on the following principles: (1) prompt receipt of compensation upon submission and approval of the request, (2) financial responsibility of Russia and reimbursement of such compensation through (international) courts. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that compensation should be paid by Ukraine with the participation of international partners before such courts' decisions of Russia's liability. Such an approach to compensation has been already employed in the draft law №5844, August 9, 2021, "On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period" (Article 3), which was submitted to the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada).
21. The Ministry of Reintegration: to complete the establishment of the "Ukrainian National Center for Peacebuilding" so that the Center can start its work in early 2022. Initially, it is important to organize the work in such a way that human rights organizations which have been collecting data and documenting human rights offenses in the temporarily occupied territories since 2014 (in particular, the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, the Regional Center for Human Rights, etc.) will be able to hand over their databases to the Center to create a unified comprehensive archive. It is also necessary to cooperate with the Office of the Prosecutor General, the Prosecutor's Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, law enforcement agencies of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

- 22.** The Ukrainian National Center for Peacebuilding: to unify the collected information on violations of human rights and freedoms by developing and agreeing on criteria and formats to order and collect data with all the bodies involved, including civic sector organizations and authorities involved in the establishment of the Ukrainian National Center for Peacebuilding.
- 23.** The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine: to provide budget funding for the development of the Virtual Museum of Russian Aggression which collects and communicates oral evidence and witness accounts of hybrid warfare and Russian aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, and violations of human rights and freedoms.
- 24.** Ministry of Reintegration: in the draft law of "On liability for offenses committed during the temporary occupation of Ukraine" (presumed by the "Plan of Priority Actions of the Government for 2021", № 276-p by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, March 24, 2021), to clearly articulate principles, definitions, conditions, criteria, and limits of the amnesty as well as procedures for its application. The comments of the Venice Commission on the bill №5844" On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period" should be accounted for while working on this document.
- 25.** While drafting the bill on amnesty, the Ministry of Reintegration: to initiate a series of dialogue events in all regions of Ukraine and with the participation of various categories of the population aimed at a nation-wide public discussion of the principles, procedures, and limits of amnesty.
- 26.** Ministry of Culture and Information Policy (MCIP): to organize a communication campaign on the necessity, principles, and limits of amnesty. Such a campaign should start shortly (i. e., before the adoption of the relevant law) and provide the general public with arguments about the necessity for amnesty.
- 27.** The Ministry of Reintegration: to provide clear definitions, principles, and criteria as well as a time frame for the application of lustration / vetting, which will be included in the draft law "On Liability for Offenses Committed during the Temporary Occupation of Ukraine". There is a need to be precise in: (1) a description of the categories of people who will be subject to lustration, (2) a list of positions to which access will be restricted, (3) the procedure for lustration, and (4) the body to exercise lustration. The lustration procedure should be based on the principles of individual rather than collective guilt and responsibility, the presumption of innocence (the body to exercise lustration must prove the person's guilt) and the temporality of lustration restrictions (i. e., specify the timeframe for restrictions). It is also necessary to clarify whether the list of positions to be restricted includes elected positions, i. e., limits the right to be elected at the local and national levels.
- 28.** The Ministry of Reintegration, while drafting the law "On Liability for Offenses Committed during the Temporary Occupation of the Territory of Ukraine": to consider the impermissibility (unjustifiableness) of restricting the right of Ukrainian citizens living in the temporarily occupied territories to vote at all levels of elections after the de-occupation.
- 29.** The Ministry of Reintegration in cooperation with the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy: to develop a Program of Dialogue and National Consultations aimed at understanding and reflecting on the consequences of Russia's armed aggression against Ukraine and the post-conflict regulation and peacebuilding. The purpose of such a program is to promote reconciliation between different groups: IDPs, veterans, ordinary residents of the temporarily occupied territories, particularly those who were forced to remain in the TOT, and other groups. Such a program should start before the

de-occupation on the territory controlled by the government of Ukraine.

## On Cultural Policy

- 30.** The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy in cooperation with the Ministry of Reintegration: to develop and formalize the principles of cultural reintegration policy (as part of the Strategy for Cultural Development or another strategic document). The aim of such a policy should be to promote a nationwide public dialogue aimed at understanding and consolidation, and therefore, the facilitation of civic identity. This policy should include a list of topics for public discussion and dialogue activities aimed at the population of all regions of Ukraine (for example, screenings of films with discussion, public lectures and debates with opinion leaders, civic activists, veterans, etc.).
- 31.** When developing the principles of cultural reintegration policy, it is necessary to coordinate the approaches of different ministries on the drafting of strategic documents: it is advisable to include different components of reintegration policy in integrated reintegration strategies and not in other sectoral / thematic strategies. For example, the “Strategy for the De-Occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol”, approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine №117 / 2021, March 24, 2021, does not contain provisions concerning the cultural aspect of reintegration of Crimea, apart of those aimed at the preservation of cultural heritage and development of indigenous cultures). Instead, the “Information Security Strategy of Ukraine”, approved by the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine on October 15, 2021, includes a section on information reintegration of TOT residents.
- 32.** The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, the Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine, and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine: to take into account that state policy in the field of culture, education, youth – especially in the context of cultural reintegration of Ukraine, reconciliation, and understanding of the consequences of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine – should be coherent and cohesive and to be implemented integrally. For example, the potential of formal and non- formal education and leisure of children, teens, and youth could be used through the inclusion of cultural products (movies, books, songs) in the (extra)curricula of educational institutions.
- 33.** The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy, the State Cinema Agency, and the Ukrainian Book Institute in the production of cultural products as means for "soft power" influence: to consider the audience's expectations and demands for such products:
- an emphasis on the story of a person or family with a war or hostilities featuring as a background;
  - the story must be true / truthful;
  - populated with three-dimensional and not “black and white” characters, situations, and dilemmas. At the same time, ‘our view’ of events must be broadcast;
  - complex and problematic topics and issues may be raised and discussed, but value-oriented and socially desirable messages should be broadcast;
  - products must have sufficiently universal codes, narratives, and messages as well as a certain level of artistic quality to be of interest not only to internal but also to external (foreign) audience which would allow their sale abroad.

**34.** Regarding the draft law №5844 “On the Principles of State Policy of the Transition Period”, Ministry of Reintegration, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Human Rights, De-Occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, National Minorities and International Relations, the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy: to consider separating the policies and measure for dismantling monuments, plaques and signs erected by the occupying power from the process and measures of so-called ‘de-communization’. It is also necessary to establish a transition period during which decommunization measures will not be implemented (i. e., will be delayed) after de-occupation. Instead, at this time, an information campaign and dialogue activities should be conducted in communities (on local level) on the need for decommunization and specific activities relevant to these communities.

### ***On Information Policy and Communication of Reintegration Policies***

**35.** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Crimean Platform, and the participants of the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) within the “Minsk process”: to raise the issue of unimpeded access of the population of the temporarily occupied territories of Crimea and areas of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts to Ukrainian broadcasting and Internet resources at the TCG’s and other international meetings.

**36.** The issue of automatic inclusion of advertisements and recommendations on YouTube (in particular, by IP in border regions) should be monitored by the responsible authorities in the context of the information security of Ukraine.

**37.** The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine, the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection and other interested bodies: to determine the level / outreach of terrestrial television and radio broadcasting as well as its availability for residents of areas bordering the Russian Federation and the TOT; to ensure the increase of such availability.

**38.** The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy and the Ministry of Reintegration: to diversify into new and alternative ways to reach certain target audiences – primarily young people under 24. For example, targeted information campaigns, targeted advertising, cooperation with bloggers on Instagram, TikTok, YouTube.

**39.** The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy and the Ministry of Reintegration: on a tender basis, to conduct communication campaigns on topics related to reintegration and transitional justice and to monitor their effectiveness according to certain criteria (coverage, number of views, etc.).

**40.** The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy and the Ministry of Reintegration: to conduct separate communication campaigns on sensitive reintegration issues, specifically targeted at specific communities (e. g., veterans). In such campaigns, it is advisable to involve people who are opinion leaders in these particular communities.

**41.** National Public Television of Ukraine (NSTU) in cooperation with the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy and the Ministry of Reintegration: to develop a series of video explainers regarding the basic principles, concepts, and causes of reintegration and transitional justice, and related topics. Such as: reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; amnesty, lustration and conditions of their application; policies to support IDPs, veterans, children from TOT of Ukraine, etc.

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## ANALYTICAL REPORT

### Towards Efficient Reintegration Policies: Advances and Challenges



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