

The study, commissioned by the School of Policy Analysis, the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology from August 27 to September 23, 2019.

The survey was conducted within the framework of the Initiative for development of think tanks in Ukraine, implemented by the International Renaissance Foundation (IRF) in partnership with the Open Society Initiative Foundation for Europe (OSIFE) with the financial support of the Embassy of Sweden in Ukraine.

The fieldwork lasted from September 8 to September 20, 2019. The survey was conducted in 110 settlements in all regions of Ukraine except the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the survey was conducted only in government-controlled territories (GCA). As a result of the fieldwork, 2,035 questionnaires were collected.

A stratified, four-stage sample randomized at each stage was developed for the survey. The sample is representative of the adult population that permanently live on the territory of Ukraine, is not currently engaged in the military service, and is not detention or medical facilities (hospitals, medical institutions).

The margin error (with probability of 0.95 and with design effect of 1.5) does not exceed 3.3% for indicators close to 50%, 2.8% for indicators close to 25 or 75%, 2.0% for indicators close to 12 or 88%, 1.4% for indicators close to 5 or 95%, and 0.7% for indicators close to 1 or 99%.

In the course of the survey, we were interested in the opinion of the Ukrainian population regarding which cultural and social reintegration instruments should be used, and whether certain aspects of the state policy on internally displaced persons (IDPs) need to be changed. In addition, the expectations of Ukrainians on the situation in case the non-government controlled territories return under the control of Ukrainian authorities, as well as on views on how the Ukrainian state should build its policy towards different categories of people living in the temporarily occupied territories (TOT).

With regard to cultural and humanitarian policies, it should be noted that **56% agree that the majority of cultural products (e.g. books, series, and movies) and media in the Donbas should be in Ukrainian**, while 43.2% are against it (Table 1).

Table 1. The majority of cultural products (e.g. books, series, and movies) and media in the Donbas should be in Ukrainian

Difficult to answer	6.1
Strongly disagree	23.0
Partially disagree	10.2
Neither agree nor disagree	14.6
Partially agree	17.3
Strongly agree	28.7

At the same time, 41.9% of the respondents agree that creation of a Russian-language TV channel will facilitate the integration of non-government controlled territories (NGCA), while 24.8% are against it. However, it is worth noting that a high percentage (19.3%) of the respondents was undecided (Table 2).

Table 2. Creation of a Russian-language TV channel will facilitate the integration of non-government controlled territories (NGCA)

Difficult to answer	19.3
Strongly disagree	16.0
Partially disagree	8.8
Neither agree nor disagree	14.1
Partially agree	16.5
Strongly agree	25.4

The vast majority (61.4%) believe that the Donbas has more in common with Ukraine than with Russia in terms of historical and cultural heritage. Of these 61.4%, 44% completely agree with this. In comparison, 14.6% of the respondents believe the opposite is the case, while 13.4% chose the “compromise” option (Table 3).

Table 3. Donbas has more in common with Ukraine than with Russia in terms of historical and cultural heritage

Difficult to answer	10.4
Strongly disagree	7.7
Partially disagree	6.9
Neither agree nor disagree	13.6
Partially agree	17.4
Strongly agree	44.0

Interestingly, the distribution of answers to this question does not depend on the language of communication at home, and the answer “strongly agree/agree” prevails among all, although those who speak Ukrainian are more definite. In fact, in regional distribution we could distinguish the Eastern region of Ukraine: unlike all other regions, where the answer was “strongly agree/agree”, the respondents from the East were more likely to choose ‘the compromising’ “both yes and no” (27, 2%), while in their answers are divided in thirds (Table 3.2).

Table 3.1. Donbas has more in common with Ukraine than with Russia in terms of historical and cultural heritage. Distribution by language of communication at home, with relatives

	in Ukrainian	In Russian	Equally use both Ukrainian and Russian	in another language	Total
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	8,8%	10,9%	14,0%	30,0%	10,4%
Strongly disagree	3,9%	12,9%	10,3%	0,0%	7,7%

Partially disagree	5,7%	8,7%	7,0%	3,3%	6,8%
Neither agree nor disagree	9,4%	18,8%	17,4%	6,7%	13,5%
Partially agree	20,2%	13,6%	16,5%	16,7%	17,5%
Strongly agree	52,0%	35,2%	34,7%	43,3%	44,1%
TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Table 3.2. Donbas has more in common with Ukraine than with Russia in terms of historical and cultural heritage. Distribution by macroregions

	West	Central	South	East	TOTAL
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	7,3%	11,9%	13,5%	6,9%	10,4%
Strongly disagree	3,9%	5,6%	8,5%	18,6%	7,7%
Partially disagree	7,0%	4,6%	6,0%	13,4%	6,8%
Neither agree nor disagree	12,5%	9,4%	12,9%	27,2%	13,6%
Partially agree	20,2%	21,5%	10,3%	14,8%	17,4%
Strongly agree	49,2%	47,1%	48,7%	19,0%	44,0%
TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Although Ukrainians are mostly convinced that a (better) informational reintegration of the occupied territories of Donbas requires a separate authority (41.6% agree, 22.3% are against), more than a third (36.1%) are either not sure, or cannot say anything. **It may also indicate a lack of awareness and a blurred understanding of the informational integration, as well as of the very idea of such an authority (Table 4).**

Table 4. For informational re-integration of the occupied territories of Donbass a separate structure (agency) is required.

DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	26.3
Strongly disagree	13.8
Partially disagree	8.5
Neither agree nor disagree	9.8
Partially agree	17.3

Strongly agree	24.3
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A number of questions of the survey pertained to the IDPs and residents of the occupied territories, in particular, to their integration and an opportunity to participate in the political life.

The vast majority of the population (79.5%) agree that IDPs should be given the right to vote in all elections, including local elections (Table 5). Moreover, if we look at the distribution of the answers to this question by macro-regions, one can see that the respondents in the South and the East of Ukraine (90.9% and 93.1% respectively) are the most persistent regarding the right to vote in all elections for the IDPs. A possible explanation for this is that these two macro-regions have accepted the largest number of IDPs, so the problem of the complexity of exercising the voting rights is more urgent and immediate (Table 5).

Table 5. IDPs should be given the right to vote in all elections, including local elections

DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	6.6
Strongly disagree	4.4
Partially disagree	4.3
Neither agree nor disagree	5.2
Partially agree	14.6
Strongly agree	64.9

Table 5.1. IDPs should be given the right to vote in all elections, including local elections. Distribution by macroregions

	West	Central	South	East	TOTAL
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	6,6%	11,3%	2,8%	2,1%	6.6%
Strongly disagree	6,1%	5,0%	3,2%	1,7%	4.4%
Partially disagree	6,4%	6,2%	1,2%	1,0%	4.3%
Neither agree nor disagree	7,2%	7,3%	2,0%	2,1%	5.2%
Partially agree	18,3%	20,9%	6,8%	5,9%	14.6%
Strongly agree	55,4%	49,4%	84,1%	87,2%	64.9%
TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

At the same time, it is interesting to look at the distribution of answers to the question whether the IDPs should not be allowed to serve in the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Although the majority do not support this “selective attitude” to the IDPs (40.7%), the percentages of those who agree (31.4%) or are hesitant (23.7%) are quite high (Table 6).

Table 6. IDPs should not be allowed to serve in the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	15.1
Strongly disagree	34.6

Partially disagree	10.1
Neither agree nor disagree	8.6
Partially agree	11.3
Strongly agree	20.4

Most Ukrainians disagree (41.4%), even though about a third (29.2%) are hesitant or unable to answer the question, saying that residents of the temporarily occupied territories (TOT) have no choice but to obtain a Russian passport (Table 7).

Table 7. Residents of temporarily occupied territories (TOT) have no choice but to obtain Russian passports.

DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	19.0
Strongly disagree	29.5
Partially disagree	12.0
Neither agree nor disagree	10.2
Partially agree	11.9
Strongly agree	17.3

Interestingly, the macro-regional distribution on this question shows that all macro-regions have similar distribution of answers (like the West and the East), with the most different residents of the Center showing greater compromise (Table 7.1).

Table 7.1. Residents of temporarily occupied territories (TOT) have no choice but to obtain Russian passports. Distribution by macroregions

	West	Central	South	East	TOTAL
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	11,7%	20,1%	24,1%	21,8%	19.1%
Strongly disagree	36,0%	22,1%	31,9%	31,1%	29.5%
Partially disagree	14,9%	12,0%	7,8%	13,5%	11.9%
Neither agree nor disagree	12,7%	9,7%	8,2%	10,0%	10.2%
Partially agree	9,5%	18,2%	8,8%	6,9%	11.9%
Strongly agree	15,2%	17,9%	19,3%	16,6%	17.4%
TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

In general, the answers of the respondents to the following question are the same, in particular, regarding what should be done in relation to those residents of non-government controlled areas (NGCA) who worked in the authorities or structures of the so-called 'DPR/LPR', cooperated with occupied authorities, etc. Only 17.3% are inclined to think that they were forced to do so. Almost the same amount (15.5%) would like to limit them in civil rights. **The majority favours that they undergo a thorough examination, which would result in a decision to limit their rights (47.9%).** All this

indicates a rather low level of tolerance of Ukrainians to the so-called structures of 'DPR/LPR' and/or those who work for them (Table 8).

Table 8. In your opinion, everyone who worked for the so-called structures of "DPR / LNP" and/or those who work for them

They were forced, they should not be restricted in civil rights (holding positions in the authorities, voting, etc.).	17.3
They must be thoroughly scrutinized by the Ukrainian special services which may or may not result in limiting their civil rights (holding positions in the authorities, voting, etc.).	47.9
They must be restricted in civil rights (holding positions in government, voting, etc.).	15.5
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	19.3

Most interestingly, the majority believes that Ukraine should support those citizens of Ukraine who worked in the authorities of the so-called 'DPR/LPR', but consciously decided to move to the side of Ukraine. 54.7% of the population agree with this, while 28.4% are hesitant or unable to answer (Table 9). The regional distribution of the answers to this question is similar in trends, although more distinct in the South and the East (Table 9.1).

Table 9. Ukraine should support those citizens of Ukraine who worked in the authorities of the so-called 'DPR/LPR', but consciously decided to move to the side of Ukraine.

DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	16.8
Strongly disagree	10.5
Partially disagree	6.3
Neither agree nor disagree	11.6
Partially agree	22.5
Strongly agree	32.2

Table 9.1. Ukraine should support those citizens of Ukraine who worked in the authorities of the so-called 'DPR/LPR', but consciously decided to move to the side of Ukraine. Distribution by macroregions

	West	Central	South	East	TOTAL
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	12,1%	17,7%	20,9%	16,6%	16.8%
Strongly disagree	15,2%	10,2%	8,5%	5,9%	10.5%
Partially disagree	10,1%	7,2%	3,2%	2,8%	6.3%
Neither agree nor disagree	14,9%	11,4%	8,3%	11,7%	11.6%
Partially agree	24,2%	29,0%	15,9%	15,2%	22.5%
Strongly agree	23,5%	24,5%	43,1%	47,9%	32.2%
TOTAL	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

As for the thesis about the need to support those who served in the illegal armed formations of the so-called 'DPR/LPR' but did not commit any crimes and decided to move to the side of Ukraine – the level of agreement with it is somewhat lower (49.9%), and the level of hesitation is somewhat higher (30.3%)(Table 10).

Table 10. The Ukrainian authorities should support those citizens of Ukraine who served in the illegal armed formations of the so-called DPR / LPR and did not commit crimes but decided to move to the side of Ukraine.

DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	18.9
Strongly disagree	12.7
Partially disagree	7.2
Neither agree nor disagree	11.4
Partially agree	20.7
Strongly agree	29.2

It is not surprising that the majority of respondents support the introduction of additional checks or procedures for residents of the occupied territories to obtain a Ukrainian biometric passport. 57.6% of the respondents agree with this (Table 11).

Table 11. Residents of occupied territories must undergo additional procedures and / or checks to obtain a Ukrainian biometric passport.

DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	13.3
Strongly disagree	15.9
Partially disagree	6.0
Neither agree nor disagree	7.2
Partially agree	18.2
Strongly agree	39.4

Interesting, though somewhat expected, are the Ukrainians' answers to the question of who should pay for the restoration of the temporarily occupied territories of the Donbas after their return to Ukrainian control. Respondents could choose no more than three options, and the most popular were: Russian Federation (59.3%), Ukraine (32.9%) and oligarchs (25.5%). According to the respondents, the U.S. and the EU should be the least involved (5.7% and 4.6% respectively) (Table 12).

Table 12. Who do you think should pay for restoration of the temporarily occupied territories of Donbass after their return to the control of Ukraine? Please select no more than 3 options.

Russia	59.3
Ukraine	32.9
Oligarchs	25.5
At the expense of funds expropriated from insurgents	16.9
International organizations	14.5
Owned occupied territories	10.8
USA	5.7

EU	4.6
<i>Other</i>	1.7
<i>DIFFICULT TO ANSWER</i>	8.7

Separately, we asked **how Ukrainians understand the special status of the Donbas and what will stand for its possible implementation**. Similarly, respondents could choose up to three answers, inclusive. It should be noted here that **just over a quarter of all respondents said that it was difficult for them to answer this question (26.5%), which may indicate that people do not actually understand what it is that is a constant use of this phrase by journalists and politicians, in media and public discourse. The two most popular content alternatives point to understanding its status as a technical step or a forced assignment. In general, the respondents' answers to this question indicate that they are cautious about the so-called "special status" (Table 13).**

Table 13. Special status for Donbass is... Choose no more than 3 options.

Transition period, time for the full reintegration into Ukraine	20.3
Forced concessions on the part of Ukraine, without which restoration of its territorial integrity is impossible	20.1
It sets a dangerous precedent that threatens the unity of the country	14.2
The Kremlin's trap for splitting Ukraine	13.9
The justified requirement of the residents of Donbass to preserve their identity uniqueness within Ukraine	13.4
A step towards the federalization of Ukraine	8.3
Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine to establish their autonomy	6.3
A trendy term for decentralization	3.6
It should extend to the whole territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions	2.8
The right of these territories to veto Ukraine's foreign policy decisions	2.4
<i>Other</i>	0.3
<i>DIFFICULT TO ANSWER</i>	26.5

We also asked the Ukrainians separately **what the 'DPR/LPR' is and whether Ukraine should stop fighting and recognize them**. Both questions had only one answer. Most often, respondents identified 'DPR/LPR' as "terrorist organizations" (20.8%), "Ukrainian territories occupied by Russia" (16.5), or as "pseudo-state entities" (15%). **Overall, 66.9% in their answers, i.e. the vast majority gave a negative assessment and/or determination of the 'DPR/LPR'.** 15.6% said it was difficult for them to answer (Table 14). Also, **the majority of Ukrainian society is against Ukraine stopping fighting and recognizing 'DPR/LPR' (53.7%) (Table 15).**

Table 14. In your opinion, the DPR / LPR is...

Terrorist organizations	20.8
Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory	16.5
Pseudo-states formations	15.0
Kremlin puppets	14.6
People's reaction to Euromaidan events	13.5
Independent States	3.8

Your option	0.3
<i>DIFFICULT TO ANSWER</i>	15.6

Table 15. Ukraine should stop fighting and recognize "DPR / LPR."

DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	12.4
Strongly disagree	43.3
Partially disagree	10.4
Neither agree nor disagree	8.4
Partially agree	6.9
Strongly agree	18.6

When it comes to possible ways to regain control of the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, the overwhelming majority of the respondents points to the importance of exceptionally peaceful negotiations (66.2%). However, right away comes to light that despite such a declared demand for peace talks, Ukrainians are not ready for most compromises (Table 16).

Table 16. The return of control over the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Lugansk regions is possible under the condition... Choose no more than 3 options.

Only peace talks	66.2
If the population of these territories wants to live in Ukraine	16.6
The pressure of the international community	12.6
Direct negotiations with the leaders of the so-called DPR / LPR	8.6
Only with the consent of Russia	7.1
By giving special status to these territories	6.7
Only by military means	6.0
It is not possible if there is a Russian Federation (in the present state)	5.8
Changes in language policy in Ukraine	4.6
Giving to the leaders of so-called "DPR / LPR" representation in the Verkhovna Rada and other Ukrainian authorities	2.0
Changes in Ukraine's foreign policy	3.1
Other	0.1
It is not possible	1.4
<i>DIFFICULT TO ANSWER</i>	9.7

Finally, in assessing the effects of regaining control of the TOT of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, respondents were more optimistic about socio-political development – a positive balance of 7.0 points, but those of economic development – a negative balance of 6.3 points (Table 17). Almost a third of respondents (30.4%) said “hard to say”.

Table 17. Return of the control of the temporarily occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions ... Choose no more than 3 options.

Will cause social and / or political conflicts in Ukraine.	13.9
Will be an impetus for the social and political development of Ukraine.	20.9
Will cause a financial blow to Ukraine.	22.2
Will contribute to the economic recovery of Ukraine.	15.9
Will make Ukraine's membership in NATO impossible.	3.2
Accelerate Ukraine's full membership in NATO.	4.8
Accelerate Ukraine's accession to the EU.	5.9
Ukraine's EU membership will be hampered.	1.2
Will help to restore good neighbourly relations with Russia.	9.3
Will worsen relations with Russia.	3.6
Other	0.4
DIFFICULT TO ANSWER	30.4